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In this article I survey the theoretical literature on environmental pol-
icy in the presence of imperfect competition, ranging from early contribu-
tions in the 1960s to the present. I cover the following market structures
when polluting ﬁr m sh a v em a r k e tp o w e ri nt h eo u t p u tm a r k e t :m o n o p o l y ,
Cournot oligopoly, Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products, price-
setting duopoly with diﬀerentiating commodities, and models of monopolistic
competition. Among the latter I consider Cournot oligopoly with free entry,
the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and Salop’s model of the circular city with pollut-
ing ﬁrms. The regulation instruments I concentrate on are emission taxes,
tradable permits, and both absolute and relative standards. I also discuss
taxation when ﬁr m sh a v em a r k e tp o w e ri nt h ei n p u tm a r k e t ,a n dIs t u d y
models where ﬁr m se x e r c i s em a r k e tp o w e ri nt h em a r k e to ft r a d a b l ep e r -
mits. In the latter case I also survey some recent results from the literature
on experimental economics. Finally, I brieﬂy discuss environmental policy
in open economies when ﬁrms have market power in international markets.
Here I suggest diﬀerent decompositions of the unilateral second-best opti-
mal tax rate, thus attempting to unify alternative interpretations of these
decompositions in the literature.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that due to their static eﬃciency economists prefer market-
based instruments of environmental policy such as emission taxes and trad-
able permits, to command and control. According to the Pigouvian rule, the
optimal price of pollution should be equal to marginal social damage. Thus,
since competitive ﬁrms equalize their marginal abatement costs to the price
of pollution, notably an emission tax rate or a price for tradable permits, a
socially optimal allocation can be decentralized. This is because (a) marginal
abatement costs are levelled out among all the polluters, and (b) marginal
abatement costs are equalized to marginal damage.
At an early stage, Buchanan & Stubblebine [1962] and Buchanan [1969]
challenged the Pigouvian paradigm by pointing out that a monopolist dis-
torts the market allocation by holding down output. Therefore, a Pigouvian
tax established to regulate emissions by a polluting monopolist, would exac-
erbate the distortion. Starting from this observation, Buchanan [1969] rides
a general attack against emission taxes in imperfectly competitive markets.
He writes "This note is presented as a contribution to the continuing dis-
mantling of the Pigouvian tradition in applied economics" and "... the whole
approach of the Pigouvian tradition is responsible for many confusions in ap-
p l i e de c o n o m i c st h a ta r es l o w l yt ob ec l a r i ﬁed ... making the marginal private
cost as faced by the decision—taking unit equal to marginal social cost does not
provide the Aladdin’s Lamp for the applied welfare theorist, and the sooner
he recognizes this the better." Finally, on the relationship of Pigouvian taxes
and market structure he writes: "It is necessary to distinguish, however, be-
tween the relevance of market structure for the emergence of externality and
the relevance of market structure for the application of Pigouvian norms ...
it is necessary, to limit the Pigouvian correctives on the tax side to situa-
tions of competition." This statement certainly over-shoots the mark with
regard to the problem of regulating a polluting monopolist, because when
environmental damage is large, a zero tax (or the absence of any other kind
of regulation) may be much worse than setting the Pigouvian level of a tax
(equal to marginal damage), even if the market structure is monopolistic.
D.R. Lee [1975] supports Buchanan’s view in principle but does not reject
emission taxes outright as a means of mitigating the externality. He was
the ﬁrst to point out that, compared to the tax rate to be imposed on a
competitive ﬁrm, a tax charged on a ﬁrm exercising market power has to
be reduced by a term including P0(Q)qi,w h e r eP and qi denote the inverse
2demand function and ﬁrm i’s output, respectively. As is well known, P0(Q)qi
represents the diﬀerence in marginal revenues between a competitive and an
oligopolistic (or monopolistic) ﬁrm.
While Lee concentrated on a standard-and-charges approach where the
emission target is assumed to be given, Barnett [1980] was the ﬁrst to rigor-
ously solve the problem of determining the second-best optimal emission level
and the corresponding second-best optimal emission tax to be imposed on
a monopolist when pollution is evaluated with reference to a social damage
function. Barnett’s article was a milestone in the theory of pollution regula-
tion under imperfect competition and opened up a new avenue for research.
There is hardly any paper on the theory of pollution control on imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms that does not refer to Barnett’s contribution.
In this chapter I survey the theory of pollution control on ﬁrms exercising
market power at some point in the market process. For this purpose I set up
a general model where the ﬁrms’ technologies, including abatement opportu-
nities, are represented by their cost functions. I distinguish two cases. In the
ﬁrst case, pollution is proportional to output and ﬁrms have no opportunity
to reduce pollution other than by reducing output. In the second case, ﬁrms
can in principle decide independently on output and emissions. In this case
Iw r i t eat y p i c a lﬁrm’s cost function as C(q,e), which is interpreted as the
cost incurred by the ﬁrm for producing q units of output with no more than
e units of emissions. This representation of the ﬁrms’ technologies is used
throughout the whole chapter, except when I focus on pure market power
in a market of tradable permits. Here the ﬁrms’ technologies are simply
represented by their abatement cost functions.
For the greater part of this chapter, I will discuss both the compara-
tive static eﬀects of diﬀerent pollution control instruments and the rules for
determining the ﬁrst- or second-best optimal levels of certain policy instru-
ments, in particular emission taxes. I start with the case of pure monopoly;
besides taxes I also study other instruments such as absolute and relative
standards. Next I summarize pollution control policies in the standard types
of oligopoly model: Cournot competition, Bertrand competition with homo-
geneous goods, price competition with diﬀerentiated commodities, Cournot
competition with free entry, and ﬁnally, monopolistic competition. Then I
turn to permit trading when only two or a small number of ﬁr m se n g a g ei n
imperfect competition on the output market. In a further section I consider
market power on some input market and investigate the consequences for
optimal or second-best optimal policy setting.
3An assumption frequently made in all these models is that the regulator
can only use environmental policy to combat two or at best three market
imperfections: The ﬁrms create an externality, they keep up prices (or hold
down output) by virtue of exercising market power, and ﬁnally, in models
with free entry, a non-optimal number of ﬁrms enter the market. The main
conclusion in all this literature is that with both types of market power,
in the output or in an input market, second-best optimal policies lead to
allocations where the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement costs fall short of marginal
damage. This implies that, under a tax policy, the second-best optimal tax
rate is smaller than marginal damage. There are two exceptions to this rule.
The ﬁrst is the case of Cournot competition with free entry, in which the
second-best optimal tax may exceed marginal damage to mitigate excessive
market entry. The second is where a monopolist has market power over an
abating input or an advanced abatement technology. In a scenario like this,
a regulator can raise the demand for abating inputs or advanced abatement
technology by raising the tax rate.
Further, I study monopoly power on the market for tradable permits. For
this purpose I elaborate a generalized version of Hahn’s inﬂuential model
[1984]. Hahn presented a simple set-up for a permit market with one large
price-setting ﬁrm and several small price-taking ﬁrms. This model has been
extended in several directions: market power on both the permit and the
output market, non-compliance by either the small ﬁrms or the large ﬁrm,
etc.. The Hahn model has also been subjected to a number of experimental
investigations which I brieﬂys u m m a r i z e .
All the models mentioned so far rely on the assumption that market power
is exercised in a closed domestic market. Since the literature on environmen-
tal policy in open economies has been treated in detail elsewhere, in particular
by Ulph [1997] in this series, I will not attempt to present a complete survey
on this large sector of the literature. However, I would like to highlight the
link between the theories of environmental policy under imperfect competition
and environmental policy as trade policy. Several environmental and trade
theorists have pointed out that in the absence of trade policy environmental
policy instruments can be (ab)used as trade policy since they can have an
impact on the terms of trade when the country applying those instruments is
large (see Markusen 1975). In particular, a country hosting large ﬁrms with
market power in international markets has to take account of several oﬀset-
ting eﬀects when calculating the unilaterally optimal emission tax rate. If
domestic consumers are also served by domestic ﬁrms engaging in imperfect
4competition on international markets, the regulator has to take account of
domestic consumer surplus and weigh this either against the terms-of-trade
or against the rent-shifting eﬀect. Due to these oﬀsetting aspects caution is
required in talking about eco-dumping whenever a government sets a domes-
tic tax rate below marginal damage. The point is that in the pure model of a
polluting monopolist, where pollution is proportional to output, the regula-
tor can even implement the ﬁrst-best allocation by choosing the appropriate
tax rate. In this case, the regulator must set the tax rate below marginal
damage since he has to take into consideration the monopolistic behavior of
the ﬁrm. Hence, in an international trade model with imperfect competition,
the regulator must take account of the dead weight loss generated at home.
Accordingly, as Duval and Hamilton [2002] have pointed out, not every issue
that makes the tax rate lower than marginal damage, is to be interpreted as
eco-dumping. To highlight these issues I extend the basic model used in this
survey to the case of international trade, I suggest alternative decompositions
of the unilateral optimal emission tax, and I discuss rival interpretations of
such decompositions with respect to terms-of-trade versus the rent-shifting
eﬀect.
In discussing important results from the literature in detail, I shall usu-
ally adapt the models of other authors to my notation and assumptions, in
order to present an integrated treatment of all the diﬀerent cases. I will also
add some new material, in cases where I have found a gap in the literature
that needs to be closed. Two such cases are optimal standards in Cournot
oligopoly with free entry and market power on factor markets. Needless to
say, there are many other gaps in the literature that need to be closed.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next sec-
tion I set up some general assumptions on the ﬁrms’ cost functions, market
demand, and the social damage function that will be used throughout this
chapter. In Section 3 I treat the pure regulation of a monopolist. Besides
the tax instrument I also study absolute standards, relative standards, and
tax/subsidy schemes. Further, I summarize several extensions of that basic
model taken from the literature. Since there are so many contributions on the
regulation of polluting oligopolies, I have decided to split up the treatment
of oligopoly into several sections. In Section 4 I investigate emission taxes
in the classical Cournot model, i.e. quantity-setting oligopoly with a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms. I extend that model to tax/subsidy schemes, and at the
end of the section I summarize several extensions taken from the literature,
such as pre-investment, ecological tax reform, and other issues. In Section 5
5I study emission taxes in price-setting oligopoly, where I treat both cases, i.e.
genuine Bertrand competition with homogeneous commodities and the case
of diﬀerentiated commodities. Section 6 deals with environmental policy in
models with market entry. Besides the classical Cournot model with free en-
try, I also present a version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model and brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
results from emission taxes in Salop’s model of the circular city. In Section
7 I present a model for an output duopoly with permit trading and brieﬂy
discuss extensions to the case of more than two ﬁrms. In Section 8 I treat
models with market power on an input market, considering the cases of pure
monopsony and Cournot oligopsony. In subsection 8.5 I brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
some results on models of market power for a clean input. Though brief, this
section is important because it yields results where the second-best optimal
emission tax may exceed marginal damage. In Section 9 I study models in-
volving market power in the permit market. The section presents a model
that generalizes the seminal model suggested by Hahn [1984] to cover the
case of several ﬁr m sw i t hm a r k e tp o w e r .Is u r v e yt h en u m e r o u se x t e n s i o n so f
the Hahn model, including experimental evidence. In Section 10 I deal with
the regulation of market power in models of international trade. Section 11
provides a summing-up, indicates some gaps in the literature and suggests
directions for further research.
2 Some Basic Assumptions
For most of this chapter I intend to discuss partial equilibrium models with
one consumption good and one pollutant. In sections 5.2 and 6.3 I will also
consider models with several private commodities, modifying assumptions on
preferences and demand accordingly.
There are n ≥ 1 ﬁrms producing a homogenous commodity. In the pro-
duction process the ﬁrms generate a pollutant emitted into the environment.
Most of the time I will assume that the pollutant is generated in this indus-
try only (i.e., by the n ﬁrms under consideration). This assumption does not
hold in all industries, of course. CO2, for example, is generated by many
diﬀerent industries. In the chemical industry, by contrast, several hazardous
pollutants are generated by the production of one commodity only. In our
framework, notably when considering imperfect competition, assuming the
pollutant to be industry-speciﬁc makes the analysis more interesting and is
of greater empirical relevance.
6As a welfare measure I will adopt the standard cost/surplus concept em-
ployed throughout the literature on industrial organization. Thus welfare is
deﬁned as gross consumer beneﬁt minus production costs minus the mon-
etarized damage from pollution, to be deﬁned more precisely below. For
i =1 ,...,nIw i l lu s eqi and ei to denote the quantity produced and supplied
on the commodity market and the emissions dumped into the environment
by ﬁrm i, respectively. Aggregate (or industry) output and total emissions
are denoted by Q :=
Pn




Preferences on the part of the consumers (or society) are represented by an
inverse demand function P and a social damage function D, where the latter
captures both the disutility that consumers suﬀer and the economic damage
that other industries suﬀer from the pollution generated by the n ﬁrms under
consideration. I make the following assumption about demand:
Assumption 1 The inverse demand function P :I R + → IR + depends on
aggregate industry output Q only. Moreover,
i) it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable for all Q ∈ { ˜ Q>0| with P( ˜ Q) >
0}.
ii) P0 is strictly decreasing, and P00 is suﬃciently bounded; in particular,




(1) says that P is not too convex. This is suﬃcient to guarantee the second-
order conditions for several maximization problems, in particular for social
optimum, proﬁt maximization of monopoly and, for the oligopolistic ﬁrm
in Cournot—Nash equilibrium. It is also suﬃcient to guarantee the stability
and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium when we consider the Cournot game in
Section 4.
For the damage function I adopt the following assumption from the liter-
ature:
7Assumption 2 The damage from pollution depends on total pollution E
only. The social damage function D(E) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
increasing and (weakly) convex, i.e. D00(E) ≥ 0.
Where certain results require strict convexity, I will make explicit mention
of this fact.
2.2 Technologies
The ﬁrms’ technologies are represented by their reduced cost functions. This
assumes that all factor markets are perfectly competitive and – both here
and in the models of imperfect competition in the output market – are not
inﬂuenced by any strategic behavior of the ﬁrms in other markets.
We will make alternative assumptions about those technologies. In the
ﬁrst assumption, pollution is proportional to output and ﬁrms do not have
any further abatement technologies:
Assumption 3 Each ﬁrms’ cost function Ci :I R + → IR + is
i) twice continuously diﬀerentiable for qi > 0.
ii) Moreover, C0
i(qi) > 0 and C00
i (qi) ≥ 0.( I f C00
i (qi) > 0 is required, this
will be explicitly mentioned.)
iii) Pollution is proportional to output, i.e. ei = δiqi, with δi > 0, for all
i =1 ,...,n.
Alternatively, I assume that ﬁr m sh a v et e c h n o l o g i e sw h e r ep o l l u t i o nc a n
be substituted for by using more of other abating inputs, which in turn
incurs higher costs. I assume that those abatement opportunities are already
incorporated in the reduced cost function written as Ci(qi,e i), i.e., the cost
depends on both ﬁrm i’s output qi and its emissions ei,t h u ss a t i s f y i n gt h e
following assumption:
Assumption 4 For each ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...,n} its cost function Ci :I R
2
+ → IR
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the following properties (we
omit the superscript i):
i) Cq > 0, Cqq > 0, Cee > 0, Cqe < 0.
8ii) For all q there exists an emission level e(q) such that Ce(q,e(q)) = 0,
and Ce(q,e) < 0 if e<e (q),a n dCe(q,e) ≥ 0 if e>e (q).
iii) The Hessian of C is positive deﬁnite. In particular, C satisﬁes
CqqCee − [Cqe]
2 > 0 . (2)
This assumption implies that the variable cost function is strictly convex.
In particular, we have increasing marginal costs for ﬁxed emission levels,
abatement costs are convex for each ﬁxed output, and output and emissions
are complements (Cqe < 0), which implies that the marginal abatement cost
increases with more output (−Ceq > 0). Moreover, for each output level there
is a cost-minimizing emission level e(q) that would be chosen by the ﬁrms in
the absence of regulation (i.e. Ce(q,e(q)) = 0). In such a case, we can deﬁne
a further reduced cost function by e C(q): =C(q,e(q)). In principle the cost
f u n c t i o nc o u l di np r i n c i p l ec o n t a i nﬁxed costs. Where these are important,
for example in models with free entry, we will also explicitly mention the
fact.
Note: Some authors, such as Barnett [1980], Conrad [1993], and Duval
& Hamilton [2002], specify certain inputs that can be used to reduce pollu-
tion. These authors write the cost function as C(q,w(τ)),w h e r ew(τ) is the
price of a polluting input including a tax rate τ (or a corresponding permit
price). Using Shepard’s Lemma it is possible to recover each ﬁrm’s level of
emissions, which are assumed to be proportional to the polluting input x,b y
the relationship e = δCw(q,w(τ)), where δ is an emission coeﬃcient.
2.3 Welfare and First-Best Allocations
To evaluate the utility and the harm of a given allocation (q1,...,q n,e 1,...,e n)
for society, we deﬁne a social welfare function W, which is additively sepa-
rable into consumers’ gross beneﬁt, production cost, and the social damage
caused by the pollution:







i(qi,e i) − D(E) (3)
where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi and E =
Pn








Ci(qi) − D(E) (4)
where total emissions are now determined by E =
Pn
i=1 δiqi.
Under Assumption 3, and if the ﬁrms’ cost functions are strictly convex,





0(E) ∀i =1 ,...,n
Thus the marginal willingness to pay equals marginal production costs plus
marginal social damage times the emission coeﬃcient of the respective ﬁrm.
Under Assumption 4, the social optimum is characterized by the following
alternative set of ﬁrst-order conditions:
C
i




0(E) i =1 ,...,n (6)
This means that the ﬁrms’ marginal cost of producing a further unit of the
marketable commodity equals the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay,
and the marginal abatement costs −Ci
e(qi,e i) are equal to the marginal social
damage. In particular, marginal costs and marginal abatement costs are
equal across all the ﬁrms.
We use (q∗
i,e ∗
i)i=1,...,n to denote the socially optimal allocation and Q∗ for
the corresponding aggregate output. The corresponding total emissions are
denoted by E∗.
2.4 Decentralization under Perfect Competition
It is easy to see that under perfect competition the social optimum can be
implemented by charging a tax rate that satisﬁes the Pigouvian rule, i.e.
equals the marginal damage resulting from the socially optimal allocation.
This can be seen as follows. The ﬁrms take the price for the output com-
modity as given and maximize
πi(qi,e i)=pqi − C
i(qi,e i) − τei
3If ﬁrms have constant marginal costs, it is socially optimal that only those ﬁrms with
the lowest marginal social cost (including marginal social damage) produce.
10which leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
C
i
q(qi,e i)=p = P(Q) i =1 ,...,n (7)
−C
i
e(qi,e i)=τi =1 ,...,n (8)
If the regulator sets
τ = D
0(E
∗) ,( 9 )
we see that (7) and (8) imply (5) and (6). Thus the socially optimal alloca-
tion results if the market equilibrium is unique, which is guaranteed by our
assumptions. Alternatively, the regulator could issue an amount of tradable
permits L equal to the socially optimal total emission level E∗.4 In the latter
case, it does not matter whether the permits are auctioned oﬀ or issued for
free (grandfathered).
I assume throughout this chapter that the society is indiﬀerent about the
redistribution of tax revenues. This implies that collecting tax revenues in
this industrial sector is not a government objective. This in its own is tanta-
mount to assuming that no other distortionary taxes (and hence no marginal
costs of public funds) exist, and that there is no additional technology that
the government can buy in order to reduce the aggregate emissions E once
these have been dumped into the environment by the ﬁrms. Thus collected
taxes will be redistributed to the consumers in a lump-sum way. Only in
Sections 3.5.8 and 4.6.6, where I brieﬂy discuss ecological tax reforms in the
presence of imperfect competition, do I deviate from this assumption.
Further, I assume that the emissions generated by each ﬁrm can be per-
fectly monitored without cost by the regulatory authorities. Accordingly, the
ﬁrms will pay a tax bill that is exactly equivalent to the amount of pollutants
they emit. In the case of permits, ﬁr m sc a n n o te m i tm o r et h a nt h en u m b e r
of permits allows them to. Otherwise I assume that a high penalty has to be
paid (boiling—in—oil policy). Thus there is no room for moral hazard. One de-
parture from this assumption is the summary of models with non-compliance
in permit markets in Section 9.
4In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition (8) is substituted by −Ci
e(qi,e i)=σ where σ is
the competitive price for tradable permits.
113 Imperfect Competition in the Output Mar-
ket: Monopoly
In this section and the following I study models of imperfect competition
in the output market, starting with monopoly. I assume that a single ﬁrm
operates in the output market and generates a pollutant that is industry-
speciﬁc (or a local pollutant). Thus regulation refers to this single ﬁrm only
and does not aﬀect other industries. A real situation represented by such a
model is a chemical or pharmaceutical ﬁrm specializing on the production of
a certain output and generating either a speciﬁc or a local pollutant.
3.1 Taxation of Monopoly when there is no Abatement
Technology
If the monopolist’s technology satisﬁes Assumption 3 and it is subject to an
emission tax τ, its proﬁt depends on output only and can be written as
Π(q)=P(q)q − C(q) − τδq
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization is then given by
P
0(q)q + P(q) − C
0(q) − τδ =0 (10)
T h es o l u t i o ni sd e n o t e db yqM(τ). Setting n =1in (4), and writing welfare

















Using (10) by substituting for P(q) − C0(q)=−P0(q)q + τδ and "solving"







5Note that we do not properly solve for τ since the right hand side of (13) also depends
on τ.





  · δ
(14)
where   = P(qM(τ))·qM(τ)/P 0(qM(τ)) is demand elasticity. By substituting
(14) into (10), we immediately see that in this case the optimal emission tax
rate leads to the ﬁrst-best outcome. The simple reason for this is that the
regulator has direct control over output by virtue of q = e/δ, and since qM(τ)
is decreasing in τ.6 Thus the regulator can induce the ﬁrm to produce the
socially optimal outcome, i.e. qM(τ)=q∗.W es u m m a r i z et h i sa s
Proposition 1 If emissions are proportional to output (or a monotonic func-
tion of output) and there is no abatement technology, there exists an emission
tax rate that implements the social optimum. The optimal tax rate is lower
than marginal damage.
Note that the tax rate can also be negative because the monopolist creates
two market imperfections by holding down output and generating a negative
externality through pollution. If the tax rate is negative, the ﬁrst imperfec-
tion dominates the second, and the regulator mitigates underprovision of the
output market by subsidizing pollution, which seems to be more a theoretical
option rather than a real one.7
3.2 Taxation of a Monopolist with Abatement Tech-
nology
I now consider the case where the monopolist’s cost function satisﬁes As-
sumption 4. Again, the monopolist is subject to an emission tax, its proﬁt
is given by
Π(q,e)=P(q)q − C(q,e) − τe
Proﬁt maximization then leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
P
0(q)q + P(q) − Cq(q,e)=0 (15)
−Ce(q,e)=τ (16)
6T h i sc a nb es e e ne a s i l yb yd i ﬀerentiating (10) with respect to τ.S o l v i n gf o rdqM(τ)/dτ
yields: dqM(τ)/dτ = δ/[P00q +2 P0 − C00] < 0 by Assumptions 1 and 3.
7Of course he can also tax or subsidize output with the same eﬀect.
13This means that marginal revenue equals the marginal cost for producing
one more unit of output, and marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax
rate. I use q(τ) and e(τ) to denote the solution to (15) and (16).
The environmental authority then seeks to maximize welfare as a function




P(z)dz − D(e(τ)) − C(q(τ),e(τ)) (17)
leading to the ﬁrst-order condition
W





where again for convenience I have written q0(τ): =dq/dτ and so on. Em-
ploying (15) and (16) and “solving” for the tax rate gives us the following














where ∂q/∂e is the reaction of output to the relaxation of an emission stan-
dard and   is the price elasticity. To determine the signs of q0 and e0,w e













[Cee]2(P00 +2 P0) − Cee(CqqCee − [Cqe]2)
< 0
w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo fA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d4 ,i np a r t i c u l a rCqe < 0, to
sign the expressions.
In this case, the second-best optimal tax rate does not lead to the ﬁrst-
best allocation, as can be seen from substituting (20) into the monopolist’s
ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization. The reason for this result is
that the monopolist can now independently decide on output and emissions,
while the regulator has only one instrument available. This result was ﬁrst
14established by Barnett [1980]. Again, the second-best tax rate falls short
of marginal damage, as can be seen from (20), and it can be even negative.
Note that the second-best optimal emission level can exceed the ﬁrst-best
level. This is due to the two market imperfections and the lack of a suﬃcient
number of instruments. A phenomenon like this should not be confused
with (environmental or) eco-dumping.8 It is merely a consequence of an
insuﬃcient number of instruments and hence of a second-best optimal setting.
As a special instance, we may brieﬂy consider the case where C(q,e) is
additively separable into the cost of production and abatement, i.e. C(q,e) ≡
CP(q)+CA(e). Since Cqe =0 ,w eo b t a i n
τ = D
0(e(τ)) ,( 2 2 )
and the second-best optimal tax rate equals marginal damage, as is also
optimal under perfect competition. We can summarize this result as follows:
Proposition 2 If C(q,e) is additively separable, the optimal emission tax
rate is independent of the commodity market structure and equal to marginal
damage, thus satisfying the Pigouvian rule.
3.3 Emission Standards
Absolute Emission Standard As an alternative to charging a price for
emissions, the regulator can set an (absolute) emission standard. If the
unregulated monopolist’s emission level exceeds the optimal emission level,
an emission standard is equivalent to an emission tax. Conversely, if the
unregulated emission level falls short of the optimal level of pollution, which is
the case when the distortion from the monopolist’s market power exceeds the
distortion resulting from pollution, the shadow price of pollution is negative,
and thus the ﬁrst-best allocation (in the case where no abatement technology
exists) cannot be implemented by a standard. The reason is simply that the
regulator cannot induce the monopolist to increase output by setting an
emission standard that does not bite.
8Although there is no unique deﬁnition in the literature, eco-dumping usually refers
to underinternalizing the social damage of pollution. See Rauscher [1994] for a careful
discussion of the concept.
15Emission Permits Grandfathering a quota of emission permits is clearly
equivalent to setting an absolute emission standard. The same applies to
auctioning oﬀ such a quota of permits. The monopolist would bid zero (or
epsilon) and obtain all the permits.
Relative Emission Standard In reality, relative emission standards are
more common than absolute standards. Under this kind of standard, a ﬁrm
is restricted with respect to its emissions per unit of output: e ≤ αq for some
number α>0. If emissions are proportional to output, i.e. e = δq,e i t h e rt h e
standard is not binding (i.e. δ. < α)o rt h eﬁrm cannot meet the standard
and has to terminate production in the short run. If the ﬁrm’s technology
satisﬁes Assumption 4 and the standard is binding, the ﬁrm’s cost function
can be written as C(q,αq).
The monopolist’s ﬁrst-order condition is then represented by
P(q)+P
0(q)q − Cq(q,αq) − αCe(q,αq)=0 (23)




Ce + q[Cqe + αCee]
P00(q)q +2 P0(q) − [Cqq +2 αCqe + α2Cee]
We see that the sign depends on the shape of the cost function. The denom-
inator is negative, while the sign of the numerator is ambiguous.
With a similar welfare-maximizing procedure to the one above, we ﬁnd
















(24) implicitly deﬁnes the second best optimal standard, denoted by α∗.W e





dα oﬀset each other, no matter
what the sign of dq/dα is. In general the sign of dq/dα is ambiguous. In
the normal case, however, we would expect dq/dα > 0 to hold. In this case
we see, as usual, that the term accounting for monopoly power is negative,
whereas the multiplier 1+α
q
dq
dα exceeds one. Thus the imperfect instrument
represented by a relative standard causes the regulator to set the emission
target at a stricter level compared to the second-best optimal emission level,
resulting from a second-best optimal emission cap or a second-best optimal
16emission tax. The reason is that the polluting ﬁrm can comply to the stan-
dard not only by reducing emissions but also by increasing output.
3.4 Regulating Emissions and Output Simultaneously
It can easily be seen that if the regulator has two regulation instruments,
namely an emission tax τ a n das u b s i d yo no u t p u tζ,t h eﬁrst-best allocation
can be achieved by setting the tax rate equal to the Pigouvian level and
the subsidy equal to ζ = P(q∗)/ (q∗), where  (q∗) is again demand elasticity
at the optimal output quantity q∗. This policy mix seems to be more of a
theoretical possibility than a real option, since subsidies are frequently not
feasible or are simply not allowed due to free trade treaties or other agree-
ments. In Section 4.4, where we discuss tax-subsidy schemes for oligopolistic
competition, we will see, however, that a tax-subsidy scheme can be mim-
icked by a tax/tax-refunding scheme as exempliﬁed by the NOX tax system
in Sweden.
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Some Remarks on Previous Work
As mentioned in the introduction, Buchanan [1969] refuses to apply emis-
sion taxes to the case of a monopolistic polluter. Siebert [1976] criticizes
Buchanan’s conclusions by setting up a formal model where emissions are
initially proportional to output but can be reduced separately by an abate-
ment technology. Siebert indicates that under such a technology both the
competitive and the monopolistic ﬁrm will choose the same level of abate-
ment activity if they are subject to the same tax rates. However, this does
not imply, as Siebert claims, that the second-best optimal tax rate is equal
to the Pigouvian level.
Prior to Barnett, Asch & Seneca [1976] and Smith [1976] had also arrived
at what is basically the same conclusion, i.e. that taxing emissions by a mo-
nopolist requires setting the tax rate below marginal social damage. Parallel
to Barnett, Misiolek [1980] generalizes the ideas of both Asch & Seneca and
Smith. Oates and Strassmann [1984] extend Barnett’s conclusions to other
forms of market structure.
173.5.2 Simultaneous Regulation of Monopoly and Competitive Firms
Innes et al. [1991] study a situation where one ﬁrm, which is a monopolist in
a given commodity market, and other ﬁrms, engaging in perfect competition
on diﬀerent output markets, emit the same pollutant. This is certainly a
realistic scenario for major pollutants such SO2 and NOX or greenhouse
gases such as CO2. The authors study the structure of the second-best
optimal tax rate when both industries can only be regulated by a uniform
tax. If we use eC(τ) and qC(τ) to denote emissions and output and CC(·,·)
to denote the aggregate cost function of the competitive sector and eM(τ),
qM(τ),a n dCM(·,·) to denote emissions, output and cost function of the














Maximizing welfare with respect to the uniform emission tax the second-










The intuition for this result is as follows: We would expect the second-
best optimal tax rate to be determined by the beneﬁts from production in
both the monopoly and the competitive sector and to be a weighted sum
from the pure second-best optimal monopoly tax and the Pigouvian tax
resulting from regulating the competitive sectors. This is indeed the case
through the multiplier [dqM(τ)/dτ]/[deM(τ)/dτ +deC(τ)/dτ]. If the reaction
of the competitive sector on a tax increase is small, i.e. deC(τ)/dτ is small,
t h em u l t i p l i e rw i l lb ec l o s et o[dqM(τ)/dτ]/[deM(τ)/dτ]. In that case the
regulator can neglect the competitive sector, and (25) will be approximately
represented by (20). If the reaction of the competitive sector on a tax increase
is large compared to the reaction of the monopolist, the multiplier will be
small and (25) will be close to the Pigouvian rule.
Furthermore, the authors show that a discriminating tax system would
be better than a uniform tax. They also show that a system of tradable
permits outperforms the uniform tax if the initial allocation of permits is
chosen appropriately. We will return to this issue in Section 9, where we
study models of market power in markets for tradable permits.
183.5.3 Several Local Monopolies
Requate [1993b] considers the case of regulating several local monopolists.
Under pure monopoly, a market for permits does not make much sense since
there is only one ﬁrm on the demand side for permits. It often happens,
however, that there are several ﬁrms, each of which exercises monopoly power
in a local commodity market and generates the same kind of pollution. The
sum of emissions caused by all the ﬁrms generates a negative externality for
an extensive region, a country, or even the whole world. Typical and highly
relevant examples of this kind of market structure are the utility industries,
especially in Europe, where the ﬁr m sh a v eh a d( a n di ns o m er e g i o n ss t i l lh a v e )
local monopoly power, and each ﬁrm emits pollutants such as SO2 and NOX,
or CO2 as a greenhouse gas. If several monopolists are subject to regulation,
issuing permits does make sense. Requate [1993b] shows that a suitable
Pigouvian tax or a suitable number of tradable permits are equivalent tools
for maintaining an aggregate pollution level below the unregulated laissez—
faire level. This corresponds to a charges-and-standards approach. As with
perfect competition, both policies lead to the same allocation. This will not
be surprising if the permit market is competitive. However, the result still
holds if the number of ﬁr m si ss m a l ls ot h a tp r i c e - t a k i n gb e h a v i o ro nt h e
permit market cannot be expected. In this case Requate assumes that the
ﬁrms negotiate about both the allocation of permits and transaction prices.
Since there is no strategic interaction on any commodity market, the ﬁrms
have an incentive to achieve a cost-eﬃcient allocation of permits amongst
themselves, leading to equal marginal abatement costs across ﬁrms. This
does not hold in general for ﬁrms interacting in the output market, as we
will see in Section 7.
Requate also studies the second-best optimal uniform tax and the second
best optimal discriminating taxes. The latter case is equivalent to several









where Pi(qi) represents the inverse demand function in market i.T h eo p t i m a l
number of permits leads to a market price for permits that is equal to the
second-best optimal tax rate determined by (26). Moreover, if the regulator
can pay discriminatory subsidies, he can implement the ﬁrst-best outcome
19by charging the Pigouvian tax. If discriminatory subsidies are not legally
feasible, we are back in the world of second-best.
3.5.4 Rent-Seeking
Misiolek [1988] points out that prior to production a monopolist tends to
expend considerable resources to establish its monopoly position. This kind
of behavior is also referred to as rent-seeking. A considerable share of these
resources are usually a waste in social terms. Misiolek argues that the reg-
ulator should account for such rent-seeking behavior. In order to lower the
incentives for rent-seeking, the second-best tax rate should be higher than
the optimal tax rate in cases where the monopolist just arrives out of the
blue. Misiolek shows that if we take rent-seeking into account, the second-
best optimal emission tax rate can be higher, lower or equal to marginal
damage.
3.5.5 When Emissions Inﬂuence Consumer Demand
Ebert and von dem Hagen [1998] extend Barnett’s [1980] basic model by
assuming that both consumer demand and production costs are aﬀected in
a negative way by pollution. This can be simply modelled by writing inverse
demand and cost functions as P(Q,E) and C(Q,E), respectively. Whereas
consumers have less beneﬁt from the output good in a more heavily polluted
environment, reﬂected by PE < 0,t h ee ﬀe c to nc o s ta n dm a r g i n a lc o s tm a y
go in opposite directions. In my view, only CE < 0, CXE < 0 is relevant,
reﬂecting the fact that the ﬁrm faces positive marginal abatement costs.
In the opposite case, the ﬁr mw o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et oi n t e r n a l i z et h e
”externality” of pollution on itself since the ﬁrm is the only polluter (this
is the Coase Theorem applied to a single agent). Moreover, the authors
allow for two policy instruments, an output tax and an emission tax. Not
surprisingly, if both instruments are available, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be
implemented where both tax rates satisfy the Pigouvian rule (being equal to
total marginal social damage). If either the emission tax or the output tax
is the only instrument, the second best optimal tax rates may exceed or fall
short of marginal damage if CXE < 0 holds, and, surprisingly, will otherwise
exceed marginal damage.
203.5.6 Taxation of a Durable Goods Monopolist
R u n k e l[ 2 0 0 4 ]e x t e n d sB a r n e t t ’ sm o d e lt ot h ec a s eo fad u r a b l eg o o d sm o -
nopolist, as developed by Bulow [1986]. However, Barnett’s rule still holds:
the second-best optimal tax rate falls short of marginal damage.
3.5.7 Overall Regulation
Laﬀont [1994] considers the overall regulation of a monopolist. Alongside
an emission tax and a subsidy on output he also suggests a lump-sum tax
for the extraction of the monopoly rent. This is especially important in the
presence of existing distortionary taxes. Laﬀont also studies regulation under
asymmetric information. Following the methodology of adverse selection
applied to regulating a monopolist with unknown costs, as suggested by
Baron and Myerson [1982], Laﬀont describes the second-best optimal policy
scheme that induces the monopolist to produce second-best optimal output
combined with the second-best optimal pollution level.
3.5.8 Environmental Tax Reform
Bayindir-Upmann [2000] studies the eﬀects of an ecological tax reform in the
case of monopoly. In his model the monopolist produces an output by means
of two inputs: capital and emissions (or a polluting input). The government
can levy both capital taxes and emission taxes. Bayindir-Upmann ﬁnds that
if the initial tax rate on the non-polluting input (in his model: capital) is
low, an environmental tax reform yields a triple dividend: it leads to a de-
crease of emissions, raises demand for non-polluting inputs, and raises the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. If the initial capital tax is extremely high, a double dividend
does not exist. Here, it is the environmental dividend that fails to mate-
rialize. In other words, a tax shift from the non-polluting to the polluting
input, increases pollution while keeping revenues constant. High initial tax
rates hamper economic activities and, thereby, induce the side eﬀect of low
demand for environmentally harmful production factors. If such a tax is low-
e r e d ,t h et o t a ld i s t o r t i o no nt h ee c o n o m yd e c r e a s e sa n dd e m a n df o rall goods
and production factors increases. This occurs even when the tax on the en-
vironmentally harmful factor increases. In this case, an ecological tax reform
stimulates production and thus increases proﬁts. This emerges, however, at
the expense of environmental quality.
21By contrast, Fullerton and Metcalf [2002], who consider a similar model
with labor and emissions, come to the opposite conclusion. The existence of
monopoly power has two oﬀsetting eﬀects on welfare. On the one hand, a
revenue-neutral tax reform that lowers the labor tax and increases the tax on
the polluting input (or emissions) lowers the monopolist’s proﬁtw h i c h ,h o w -
ever, leads to an increase of labor supply. This partially oﬀsets pre-existing
labor supply distortion. On the other hand, the ecological tax reform raises
output prices, and this, together with the pre-existing monopoly distortion,
further exacerbates the labor supply distortion. The authors show that for
empirically relevant parameters the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst. Thus,
monopoly power does not raise the probability of achieving a double dividend
from a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform. The more optimistic result in
Bayindir-Upmann [2000] may be is driven by both the inelastic supply of
capital and the initially low tax rate on capital. Thus, in contrast to a la-
bor market, there is no distortion resulting from the supply of capital. We
will return to ecological tax reforms and the double dividend hypothesis in
Section 4.6.6.
4 Environmental Policy for Cournot Oligopoly
After this discussion of the polar cases of market structure, namely perfect
competition and monopoly, I now turn my attention to the wide array of
oligopoly models. Of those the one discussed in the literature in most de-
tail is the Cournot model, where ﬁrms use quantities as strategic variables.
Accordingly, I shall be giving this model a relatively large amount of space
in this survey. The Cournot model also links the perfect competition and
monopoly models in a very natural way.
The most relevant example of this kind of market structure with pollution
regulation is the energy sector, where a homogeneous product, electricity, is
produced and ﬁrms compete (at least locally) à la Cournot. Other examples
a r es a l te ﬄu e n t sf r o ms a l tm i n i n g ,w h e r eas m a l ln u m b e ro fﬁrms pollute a
river. This was the case with the river Rhine at the border between France
and Germany, or with the rivers Elbe and Werra in former Eastern Germany.
There are many other examples involving near-homogeneous products.
In this section I start the analysis by studying the tax instrument and I also
brieﬂy discuss standards. Since in oligopoly models the analysis of permits is
more complicated than in other models, I treat that instrument in a separate
22section (7). The ﬁrst researcher to investigate emission taxes for Cournot
oligopoly was Levin [1985], who mainly studies the comparative statics eﬀects
of increasing an emission tax in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. However,
Levin does not take damage from pollution into account and so he does not
discuss the structure of the (second-best) optimal tax rate. To the best of my
knowledge, Ebert [1992] was the ﬁrst to present a second-best analysis for
Cournot oligopoly, restricting his attention, however, to the case of symmetric
ﬁrms. Later, Simpson [1996] also discusses the case of asymmetric duopoly.
I begin with a more general model and derive the main results produced by
Levin, Ebert, and Simpson as special cases.
Unless otherwise stated, I assume in this section that an environmental
authority can set a uniform emission tax rate per unit of eﬄuent only. Here,
the authority neither has the power to regulate output distortions, say, by
subsidizing output (cf. Cropper & Oates [1992]), nor can it charge individual
taxes. The informational structure is such that the government knows what
technologies are out there but does not necessarily need to know exactly
which ﬁrm has which technology. In Section 4.4, I brieﬂy consider the case
where the regulator has two instruments at his disposal, a uniform emission
tax and a subsidy on output.
4.1 The General Framework
I consider a quantity-setting Cournot game with n ﬁrms, where the number of
ﬁr m si sa s s u m e dt ob ee x o g e n o u s l yg i v e n .T h eﬁrms produce a homogeneous
commodity. Its market price is determined by aggregate output according to
p = P(Q). The ﬁrms’ technologies satisfy Assumption 4. Thus, if a ﬁrm is
subject to an emission tax, its proﬁti sg i v e nb y
Π
i(qi,e i,q −i)=P (Q)qi − C
i(qi,e i) − τei ,( 2 7 )
where q−i =( q1,...,q i−1,q i+1,...,q n) is the strategy proﬁle of the remaining
n − 1 competitors. Firms are assumed to play Nash equilibrium, which due
to our model assumptions is unique and stable. We also assume that the





n(τ)). Thus the equilibrium strategies are
interior solutions to the ﬁrms’ non-cooperative proﬁt maximization problems



















i(τ)) = τ (29)
In the following we omit the asterisks and for simply write for short qi(τ),
ei(τ) and so on.
4.2 Comparative Statics
In order to study the impact of a tax raise on output and emissions, we can






















i =1.( 3 1 )
where for convenience I have again written q0
i = dqi/dτ and so on. Solving







ee[P00qi + P0]Q0 + Ci
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.( 3 3 )
where Ai = Ci
qqCi
ee − [Ci
qe]2 is the Hessian of the cost function. In contrast
to the monopoly case we cannot unambiguously sign q0
i, since the sign of the
ﬁrst term of the numerator of (32) is ambiguous. However, by summing over






















Studying these terms, we see that by virtue of Assumptions 1 and 4 Q0 is
negative. This gives rise to the following result:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 4, aggregate output is decreasing
in τ.
24This result also is obtained by Levin [1985] and Ebert [1992] proceeding
from more restrictive assumptions. By contrast, signing E0 is not possible in


















Here the ﬁrst term is negative, but under Assumption 1 the second term is
positive, such that the sign of the whole expression cannot be determined
unambiguously. Below, I consider some special cases where we can sign the
change of aggregate emissions as a function of the emission tax. It will
transpire, however, that in general the sign of dE/dτ is indeed ambiguous.
What about the ﬁrm’s proﬁts? One can show that where ﬁrms are suﬃ-
ciently symmetric proﬁts go down if the tax rate increases. Simpson [1995]
shows that if ﬁrms are suﬃciently diﬀerent, one ﬁrm may beneﬁtf r o mt a x a -
tion. Carraro and Soubeyran [1996] indicate detailed conditions under which
both uniform and ﬁrm-speciﬁc taxes lead to an increase or decrease in proﬁts
and market shares. This eﬀect can be illustrated by a simple duopoly exam-
ple with constant marginal costs c1 ≤ c2, pollution proportional to output,
i.e. ei = δiqi, and linear demand: P(Q)=1− Q. In this case, proﬁts are
given by Πi =( 1−2(ci +δiτ)+cj +δjτ)2/9.T h u sdΠi/dτ > 0 if and only if
δj > 2δi.T h u sﬁrm i beneﬁts from a higher tax rate if and only if the other
ﬁrm pollutes double as much per unit of output as ﬁrm i.
4.3 Second-Best Taxation








i(qi(τ),e i(τ)) − D(E(τ)) (36)
Diﬀerentiating (36) with respect to τ and employing (28) and (29) (assuming






































25w h e r ew eh a v ea g a i nw r i t t e nq
0
i for dqi/dτ and so on.
Setting W0(τ)=0and ”solving” for τ (note again that the right hand














i.A sw eh a v es e e na b o v e ,E0 can be positive if ﬁrms are
extremely asymmetric. But this implies that the second-best optimal tax rate
may also exceed marginal damage. The main ﬁndings can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold. Then the following is
true:
i) If ﬁrms are suﬃciently similar, in the sense that the diﬀerences of their
costs |Ci(q,e) − Cj(q,e)| (including derivatives) are suﬃciently small
(leading to similar equilibrium output and emission levels), then
(a) aggregate emissions are decreasing in the emission tax rate;
(b) the second-best optimal tax rate falls short of marginal pollution
damage;
(c) both ﬁrms’ proﬁts fall if the tax rate increases.
ii) If ﬁrms are suﬃciently asymmetric, in the sense that their cost func-
tions are suﬃciently diﬀerent, then
(a) it is possible that for particular tax-rate intervals aggregate emis-
sions are increasing;
(b) the second-best tax rate may exceed marginal damage;
(c) in a duopoly, one ﬁrm at most can beneﬁtf r o mat a xr a i s e .I na n
oligopoly model with n>2, at least one ﬁrm will incur decreasing
proﬁts, but several ﬁrms may enjoy increasing proﬁts when the tax
goes up.
Thus, we see that if ﬁrms are symmetric or suﬃciently similar, we obtain
t h es a m er e s u l t si nq u a l i t a t i v et e r m sa si nt h ec a s eo fm o n o p o l y . I fﬁrms
are asymmetric, some perverse eﬀects may arise. The intuition is that if the
26marginal cost diﬀerential between the ﬁr m si sd i ﬀerent from the diﬀerence in
emission coeﬃcients, taxation changes the cost structure between the ﬁrms.
This can not only lead to a situation where one ﬁrm gains whereas the another
ﬁrm suﬀers from a tax increase, but can also cause aggregate pollution to
rise and the tax rate to exceed marginal damage. For the last two eﬀects
to arise, however, asymmetry of ﬁr m sd o e sn o ts u ﬃce. We also need an
inverse demand function which has an extreme curvature, i.e. which is either
suﬃciently convex or suﬃciently concave (see Levin [1985] and section 4.3.1.B
below).
4.3.1 Some Special Cases
A: Symmetric Firms If ﬁrms are symmetric, i.e. Ci(·,·)=C(·,·) for all
i, uniqueness of equilibrium requires a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., qi = q =














Cee[P00Q +( n +1 ) P0] − A
< 0 ,
and hence e0 = E0/n < 0.















where dq/de is the reaction of output to the relaxation of an emission cap. In
all these equations, the second term is clearly smaller than zero. Therefore,
as in the monopoly case, the tax rate falls short of marginal social damage.
Since the oligopolistic industry output Q(τ∗) is less than the competitive
output, and since ∂
∂qe(q,τ) > 0, aggregate emissions E(τ∗) are smaller than
they are in the case of perfect competition. Hence, the (second-best) optimal
emission tax rate is lower for oligopoly compared to the Pigouvian tax rate
under perfect competition.
Moreover, (40) suggests that the second-best optimal tax rate increases if
the number of ﬁrms increases.9 This is quite intuitive. The higher the number
of ﬁrms, the closer the market outcome is to the competitive outcome and
9Inspection of (40) shows that the direct eﬀect of increasing n on the second best tax
27the closer the tax rate is to the Pigouvian level. This is also emphasized by
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [1996].
B: No Abatement Technology (The Models by Levin [1985] and
Simpson [1995]) This case mainly serves to illustrate that raising an
emission tax can indeed cause more pollution. Therefore I assume, as in
the Levin model [1985], that ei = δiqi for each ﬁrm. Let D :=
Pn
i=1 δi.T h e
ﬁrms’ cost functions Ci(qi) depend on output only. Moreover, for simplicity
I assume C00
i = C00 for all i.I f ﬁrms face a uniform tax on emissions, their
ﬁrst-order proﬁt maximization conditions in Nash equilibrium are given by
P
0(Q)qi + P(Q) − C
0
i(qi) − τδi =0 i =1 ,...,n (41)



























i[(n +1 ) P0 − C00] − D2P0
D · E
Thus aggregate emissions increase with a rise in tax if the inverse demand
function is either suﬃciently concave or suﬃciently convex. Since aggregate
output deﬁnitely drops as the tax rate goes up, we can conclude that in
Levin’s example a small emissions subsidy will increase welfare since output
goes up while emissions go down. However, we cannot conclude from Levin’s
result that it is optimal to subsidize pollution whenever E0(0) > 0.T h e
reason that emissions go up while industry output goes down must be that
some ﬁrms with high pollution raise their output whereas those with low
pollution cut down on production. However, if the tax rate is set suﬃciently
high, so that each ﬁrm’s output goes down, then aggregate emissions also have
to go down, compared to the laissez-faire level. It should not be diﬃcult to
ﬁnd examples with suﬃciently steep damage functions where a suﬃciently
high tax improves welfare in comparison with to the laissez-faire level.
rate is positive. To show that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀects, we need to
diﬀerentiate (40) totally with respect to τ.In order to establish the result dτ∗/dn > 0,w e
have to assume that the third derivatives of the ﬁrms’ cost functions Ci have the "right"
sign or are suﬃciently bounded. Assumptions like these are always necessary when doing
comparative statics of second-best instruments with respect to exogenous parameters.
28C: Symmetric Firms with Pollution Proportional to Output [Ebert’s
Model] In the ﬁr s tp a r to fh i sp a p e r ,E b e r t[ 1 9 9 2 ]a s s u m e st h a te m i s s i o n s
are completely determined by output, i.e. e = δq.10 In this case, the emission














Note that the term −P0(Q)Q/n is equal to the optimal subsidy ζ on out-
put, if we could subsidize output directly.11 H e n c ew ec a nr e w r i t e( 4 3 )a s
τ∗ = D0(E∗) − ζ/δ, i.e. the tax equals marginal damage minus the optimal
subsidy divided by the emission coeﬃcient, which seems reasonable. The
main insights gained in this subsection can therefore be summarized as fol-
lows:
Proposition 5 a) If oligopoly is symmetric and ﬁrms do not have an abate-
ment technology, i.e., pollution is determined completely by output, then there
is always an emission tax rate that implements the social optimum.
b) In a case like this, the tax can also be charged on output. The optimal










The last statement is easily veriﬁed.
4.4 Emission Taxes cum Subsidy System
4.4.1 The Basic System
We have seen that if emissions are completely determined by output, and
ﬁrms are symmetric, the regulator can simultaneously stir emissions and
output to the optimal level. If the ﬁrms can decide separately on output and
emissions, the regulator will need at least two instruments to regulate output
10In fact, Ebert’s model is slightly more general by assuming that e is an increasing
function of q.
11See Section 4.4 below, where we study a tax/subsidy system in more detail for the
case where the ﬁrm can separately decide on output and emissions.
29and emissions. However, if ﬁrms are asymmetric, even the two instruments
lead to second-best allocations only.
In this section we will consider the case where the regulator has two in-
struments, an emission tax τ and a subsidy on output ζ. In this case the
ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order proﬁt maximization conditions, which constitute the Nash
equilibrium, are given by







In the case of a uniform tax/subsidy system, we obtain the following formula















































Furthermore, one can show that ∂qi/∂τ < 0, ∂ei/∂τ < 0, ∂qi/∂ς > 0,a n d
∂ei/∂ς > 0 if the ﬁrms are not too diﬀerent. In this case too, ∂Q/∂τ < 0,
∂E/∂τ < 0,∂ Q / ∂ ς>0,a n d∂E/∂ς > 0 hold.










In this case the optimal tax/subsidy system (τ,ζ) in fact implements the
social optimum. This is not surprising as we have two targets q and e,
identical for all ﬁrms, and two instruments.
4.4.2 Extensions of Tax/Subsidy Schemes
Tax/Tax-refunding Schemes As set out in Section 3.4, subsidies on out-
put are not a realistic policy option for coping with market power. Gers-
bach and Requate [2004], however, show that in a Cournot model a tax/tax-
refunding scheme may mimic such a tax-subsidy scheme. They study emis-
sion taxes with a system of refunding tax revenues back to ﬁrms according to
30market shares, as is the case for the NOX−emission tax system in Sweden. If
ﬁr m sc o m p e t eàl aC o u r n o t ,t h eﬁrms’ objective function is then determined
by
π
i(qi,e i,q −i,e −i)=P(Q)qi − C







where ϕ with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 is the share of tax revenues to be refunded to ﬁrms.
Gersbach and Requate show that if market failure through pollution exceeds
the market externality through market power, an optimal tax/tax-refunding
scheme mimics an optimal tax/tax-subsidy system. They also show that in
symmetric oligopoly, except where the marginal distortion from oligopolistic
behavior exceeds the marginal social damage, it is possible to ﬁnd a tax rate
τ and a refunding share ϕ that implement the social optimum. Since the
optimal share ϕ is usually smaller than 1, complete refunding, as exercised
in Sweden for NOX emissions, is, however, generally not optimal.
Leontief Technologies Requate [1993a] considers an asymmetric duopoly
with linear technologies, i.e. ﬁrms have constant marginal costs c1 <c 2,a n d
emissions are proportional to output ei = δiqi. The interesting case is where
the ﬁrm with the lower private cost has the higher emission coeﬃcient, i.e.
δ1 >δ 2. Since emissions are determined by output, Requate ﬁnds that in
this case also, there exists a tax/subsidy system that implements the social
optimum.
Optimal Non-linear Tax/Subsidy Schemes We have seen in Section
4.4 that a regulator can decentralize the ﬁrst-best allocation by a uniform
tax/subsidy system only if ﬁrms are symmetric. Kim and Chang [1993]
propose an ingenious non-linear tax/subsidy scheme that works for asym-
metric ﬁrms engaging in imperfect competition. Though their scheme is
non-discriminatory, it nevertheless leads to the ﬁrst-best allocation. This
system, which is a modiﬁed version of the one proposed by Loeb and Magat
[1993] to regulate utilities, can even be employed if the regulator is imper-
fectly informed about the ﬁrms’ technologies. The system works as follows:12
The regulator proposes a non-linear tax/subsidy function T(qi,e i, ˜ q−i, ˜ e−i),
12Kim and Chang model the ﬁrms’ cost functions in a slightly diﬀerent way. I have
adapted their model and notation to the model used throughout this survey.
31where ˜ q−i =
P
j6=i qj and ˜ e−i =
P
j6=i ej represents the aggregate output and
emissions of the other ﬁrms with the exception of ﬁrm i.T h e p r o ﬁto fa
typical ﬁrm is then given by
Π
i(qi,e i,q −i,e −i)=P(Q)qi − C
i(qi,e i) − T(qi,e i, ˜ q−i,˜ e−i)





q(qi,e i)=Tqi(qi,e i, ˜ q−i, ˜ e−i) (50)
−C
i
e(qi,e i)=Tei(qi,e i, ˜ q−i, ˜ e−i) (51)
From this we see that if we choose the function T(·) as follows:




then the Nash-equilibrium conditions induce the ﬁrst-best outcome.13
What makes this mechanism so attractive is that it is not only non-
discriminatory but also reduces the regulator’s informational burden. The
regulator only needs to know the damage and the demand functions; he re-
quires no knowledge of private ﬁrm data. Of course, each advantage is oﬀset
by some disadvantage. The ﬁrms do not know exactly how large their ﬁ-
nal costs will be since their tax bill (or subsidy) depends not only on their
own decision but also on the choices about output and emissions made by
the other ﬁrms. Note, however, that this is also the case under a system of
tradable permits.
4.5 Standards
As I shall be dealing with regulation by permits in a separate section (7),
Ih e r eb r i e ﬂy discuss the two kinds of standards that have already been
introduced in Section 3. Actually, for symmetric oligopoly, the results are
not very diﬀerent from the monopoly case. For simplicity, I will only treat the
symmetric case here, restricting my attention to instances where the ﬁrms’
technologies satisfy Assumption 4.
13Note that the term D(˜ e−i) is not necessary for eﬃciency. It does however guarantee
that each ﬁrm only pays for the additional damage it generates over and above the other
ﬁrms’ emissions. It prevents the ﬁrms’ tax burden from becoming too high.
32As under an absolute emission standard no ﬁrm is allowed to emit more
than ¯ e units of emissions, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a symmetric in-
dustry is determined by just one equation:
P(nq)+P
0(nq)q − Cq(q,¯ e)=0 (52)
This yields symmetric individual output q(¯ e). I ti se a s yt os h o wt h a ti f
the standard is binding, output goes up when the standard is relaxed, i.e.





Accordingly, the marginal abatement costs are once again lower than mar-
ginal damage. If the right-hand side of the last equation is positive, taxes and
standards are equivalent, which is not surprising in the light of the monopoly
model.
A relative standard restricts emissions per units of output: e ≤ αq.I ft h e
standard is binding, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts can be written as: P(Q)q − C(q,αq),
as in the monopoly case, and the Nash equilibrium condition in symmetric
oligopoly is given by
P
0(Q)q + P(Q) − Cq(q,αq) − αCe(q,αq)=0 (53)
Again, the comparative statics eﬀect dq/dα is ambiguous, although we intu-
itively would expect dq/dα > 0, i.e. a stricter standard would lead to lower















W es e et h a tt h e r ei sn og e n e r a lw a yof determining whether or not the
marginal abatement costs exceed or fall short of marginal damage. In the
"normal" case, i.e. dq/dα > 0, the strategic term P0(Q)
dq
dα is negative but
the multiplier 1+α
dq
dα is greater than 1. The marginal abatement cost may
now exceed marginal damage. The intuition is the same as in the case of
pure monopoly: the relative standard can be met by reducing emissions or
extending output. The latter strategy is not conductive to the protection
of the environment. In order to work against such a strategy, the regulator
using an ineﬃcient instrument has to devise a the stricter standard than in
the case of an absolute emission standard.
33If we have the "perverse" eﬀect of dq/dα < 0, the strategic term is positive
but the multiplier 1+α
dq





dα always work in opposite directions.
4.6 Further Extensions of Emission Taxation in Cournot
Oligopolies
4.6.1 Emission Taxes and Endogenous Market Structure
In the model with constant marginal costs c1 <c 2 and emission coeﬃcients
δ1 >δ 2, referred to above, Requate (1993a) also discusses endogenous market
structure. I.e., depending on the size of the tax rate, the outcome can be
either monopoly or duopoly. For this purpose, Requate writes the damage
function as D(E,s),w i t hDs > 0 and DEs > 0. The parameter s deter-
mines the slope of the damage function and can be interpreted as a damage
parameter where higher s leads to both higher damage and higher marginal
damage.14 As is intuitively obvious I show that it is socially optimal for ﬁrm
1 only to produce if the damage function is suﬃciently ﬂat, for ﬁrm 2 only
to produce if the damage function is suﬃciently steep, and for both ﬁrms
to produce in the case of moderately steep damage functions. I use [s, ¯ s]
to denote the interval of damage parameters at which it is optimal for both
ﬁrms to produce. I show that the ﬁrst-best allocation can only be induced
by an emission tax if the damage parameter is suﬃciently low, i.e. for s< s
(where s is some parameter smaller than s), in which case only ﬁrm 1 will
produce, or if the damage parameter is suﬃciently high, i.e. for s>s (where
s is some parameter greater than ¯ s), in which case only the cleaner ﬁrm will
produce. As mentioned above, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be restored for
each s by a suitable tax/subsidy system.
4.6.2 Inter-Firm Externalities
Yin [2003] presents an important extension of the oligopoly model by con-
sidering externalities between the producers. This model is based on the
assumption that the ﬁrms’ costs are raised by total pollution. For both
14The steepness of the damage function (the slope of the marginal rates of substitution
of the preferences) is also of signiﬁcance in related models, for example in Weitzman’s
[1974] paper on regulation under imperfect information. See also Baumol and Oates
[1988].
34Cournot and price competition with diﬀerentiated commodities, Yin ﬁnds
that the second-best optimal tax rate exceeds marginal damage (which here
is determined by the ﬁrms’ productivity and proﬁt loss caused by the exter-
nality) if the externality is considerable and the number of competing ﬁrms
is large. More speciﬁcally, this is the case if and only if the tax eﬀects on
total pollution and on total output go in opposite directions. Interestingly,
when output increases by raising the tax rate, there is no trade-oﬀ between
environmental quality and consumer surplus.
4.6.3 Pre-investment
Carlsson [2000] extends the duopoly model proposed by Simpson [1995] to
allow for pre-investment in abatement capital with a view to reducing future
emissions from production. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are given by
Π
i(q1,q 2)=P(q1 + q2)qi − C
i(qi,x i) − rxi − te
i(qi,x i)
where qi denotes output, xi the amount of abatement capital to be invested
in the ﬁrst period, r the price of capital, and e(qi,x i) the emission function.
Firms play one-, two- or three-stage games, respectively. In the ﬁrst game,
ﬁrms play open-loop strategies by committing simultaneously and irreversibly
to the levels of both investment and production. The second game is the usual
two-stage game where ﬁrms invest in the ﬁrst stage and compete à la Cournot
in the second stage. In the third game, one ﬁrm is a Stackelberg leader, with
the ﬁrst-mover advantage of choosing the level of capital. The authors ﬁnd
that if abatement capital enhances the marginal costs of production, then in
the open loop game the second-best optimal tax rate falls short of marginal
damage for "normal" parameters. The same holds true for the closed loop
game, except in the case where ﬁrms are extremely diﬀerent. By contrast,
little can be said about the Stackelberg case.
4.6.4 Dynamic Model with Accumulating Pollutants
Benchekroun and Van Long [1997] extend the duopoly models proposed by
Simpson [1995] and Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [1997] to the case of an
accumulating stock pollutant leading to a dynamic model with an inﬁnite
time horizon. Two ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in the ﬁnal output market,
and their emissions are subject to taxation. Firms are symmetric and emis-
sions are proportional to output. The ﬁrms may employ either open-loop or
35Markov perfect (feedback) strategies. Benchekroun and Van Long ﬁnd that
in both cases a time-independent tax rule exists, i.e. a tax rule depending
on the current stock of pollution only, which leads to a socially optimal out-
come. This is not surprising in the light of Proposition 5 from the static
model. The tax rate may be negative, i.e. it turns into a subsidy in the ini-
tial time interval when the pollution stock is still low. Surprisingly however,
this subsidy induces the ﬁrms to produce less than they would in the case of
laissez-faire. The reason is that they know that if they produce more, then
the subsidy will be reduced in future and/or will (sooner) be converted into
at a x .
4.6.5 Durable Goods
Runkel [2002] and [2004] investigates the taxation of oligopolists producing
a durable good that creates waste after it has expired. He ﬁnds that if the
durability of the good is exogenous, the second-best tax rate in the second
period falls short of marginal damage (as usual), whereas in the ﬁrst period
the emission tax rate may be higher or lower than marginal damage. If
durability is endogenous, over-internalization may also occur.
4.6.6 Ecological Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition
Imperfect competition in the output market has also been considered in the
recent literature on ecological tax reforms. After the enthusiasm about the
existence of a double dividend was dampened by Bovenberg & De Mooji
[1994] and several other papers by Bovenberg and co-authors15,s o m er e -
searchers have tried to rescue the idea of a double dividend by introducing
imperfect competition into the models. In a model with monopolistic com-
petition on the output market, Marsiliani and Renström [1997] show that
besides the environmental dividend a second dividend on the labor market
caused by boosting employment may or may not arise as a result of a revenue-
neutral ecological tax reform. Holmlund and Kolm [2000] come to a similar
conclusion.
Bayindir-Upmann [2000] investigates a general equilibrium model with
Cournot competition on the output market for a dirty consumption good. As-
suming sticky nominal wages and consumers displaying Cobb-Douglas pref-
15I have not listed all these papers here because this is not the central concern of this
article. For an excellent survey see Bovenberg [1999].
36erences with respect to clean and dirty goods, Bayindir-Upmann shows that
a double dividend resulting in both a reduction in consumption of the dirty
good and more employment can be achieved if both the initial labor tax rate
and the share of income spent on the dirty good are suﬃciently low. How-
ever, for the more interesting and more relevant case involving a high initial
labor tax rate and a high consumption level for the dirty good, a double
dividend does not exist. This is not because raising the tax rate on the dirty
good further increases unemployment, but rather because consumption of
the dirty good rises so that the environmental dividend is lost. This con-
versely implies that lowering the tax rate on the dirty good will improve
environmental quality but at the same time raise unemployment. The range
o fp a r a m e t e r sf o rw h i c had o u b l ed i v i d e n de x i s t ss h r i n k sw i t ht h ed e g r e eo f
competition. Hence the results are less optimistic than in the case of pure
monopoly, which is discussed in Bayindir-Upmann [1997]. This result is also
consistent with the ﬁndings of Fullerton and Metcalf [2002].
It is worth mentioning that many authors of ecological tax-reform lit-
erature only consider the comparative statics eﬀects of a revenue-neutral
ecological tax reform and do not investigate the second-best optimal tax
structure.16
4.6.7 Financial Structure of Firms and Emission Taxes
Damania [2000] presents an oligopoly model in which he explicitly takes
account of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure. He considers a regime in which the
regulator ﬁrst makes a commitment to his tax rate, and then the ﬁrms play
a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage they choose the ﬁnancial structure
(level of leverage), in the second they choose their level of abatement (or
their abatement technology), and ﬁnally they decide on the level of output.
Damania shows that higher tax rates can lead to higher output and emission
levels. In that model the reason is that an increase of emission taxes increases
the probability that ﬁrms go bankrupt, so ﬁrms will focus only on the solvent
states of the world. This in turn encourages ﬁrms to increase output and
emission levels. One result of this may be that increasing emission tax leads
to the adverse eﬀect of raising emissions.
16This does not hold for the most inﬂuential paper on the double dividend by Bovenberg
and de Mooji [1994] or for other papers by Bovenberg and co-authors.
374.6.8 Dynamic Approach with Capital Accumulation in Clean and
Dirty Technology
Stimming [1999] studies the dynamic implications of emission taxes by setting
up a Cournot duopoly model where ﬁrms can accumulate capital for dirty
and clean technologies, respectively. She ﬁnds that, for both a tax and a
permit regime, a stricter policy induces ﬁrms to reduce investment in the
dirty technology, whereas the eﬀect on the clean technology is ambiguous.
As expected, output and emissions go down. A perverse eﬀect - stricter
environmental policy increasing aggregate emissions - can result, if the ﬁrms
are regulated diﬀerently, one by a tax, the other by a standard.
4.6.9 Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
Besides perfect competition and symmetric Cournot oligopoly, Conrad and
Wang [1993] also consider the case where the market is governed by both
ad o m i n a n tﬁrm and a competitive fringe. The model is thus similar to
Innes et al. [1991], to be discussed in Section 9. The authors only consider
the comparative statics eﬀects, they do not investigate the second-best op-
timal tax rule. The results are as expected. If both the dominant and the
competitive ﬁrms are subject to the same tax rate, a tax increase induces a
decrease of both output and emissions from both types of ﬁrm. If the fringe
ﬁrms are foreign ﬁrms not subject to taxation, the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
domestic tax may be oﬀset by an increase of foreign emissions (the leakage
eﬀect). The authors also investigate abatement subsidies in models of sym-
metric oligopoly and monopoly, alongside their dominant ﬁrm model. They
ﬁnd that, contrary to the case of perfect competition with a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrms, increasing the subsidy leads to an increase in output. Hence emissions
may rise or fall.
4.6.10 Diﬀerentiated Emission Taxes
Van Long and Soubeyran [2005] study asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with
diﬀerentiated taxes. They also take account of the marginal costs of public
funds such that the regulator also has a motive for collecting taxes. They ﬁnd
that high-cost ﬁrms should be taxed at a higher rate. Moreover, the optimal
tax structure leads to an increase in market concentration as measured by
the Herﬁndahl index.
385 Emission Taxes in Price-Setting Duopoly
In this section I treat oligopoly models where ﬁrms use prices as strategic
variables. I start by outlining the case of genuine Bertrand Competition,
i.e. price competition where commodities are homogeneous and ﬁrms incur
constant marginal costs without being capacity-constrained. Then in Section
5.2, I discuss the case of price competition with diﬀerentiated commodities.
I have elected to restrict analysis to the duopoly case for several reasons. In
the genuine Bertrand case, more than two ﬁrms do not lead to any further
insights. In the case of diﬀerentiated commodities, there are no general
symmetric models of price-setting oligopoly with diﬀerentiated commodities.
Moreover, asymmetric models with more than two ﬁrms would require a
large amount of notational clutter without yielding any essential additional
insights.
5.1 Bertrand Duopoly with Homogeneous Commodi-
ties
Requate [1993c] studies price competition among ﬁrms that supply a ho-
mogeneous good and have constant marginal costs without being capacity-
constrained. This kind of competition is usually referred to as real Bertrand
competition. For this purpose I use the same model as in Section 4.6.1, i.e.
two ﬁrms producing with constant (asymmetric) marginal costs c1 <c 2 and
emitting a pollutant proportional to output, i.e. ei = δiqi. I consider both
cases, where the ﬁrm with lower production cost, i.e. ﬁrm 1, is also the
cleaner ﬁrm, i.e. δ1 <δ 2, and the case where it is the worse polluter, i.e.
δ1 >δ 2.T h e ﬁrst case is not very interesting since ﬁrm 2 will be out of
business for any level of tax rates. Therefore we focus on the second case, i.e.
δ1 >δ 2. Tough competition (of this kind) implies that the tax can always
induce only one ﬁrm to produce whenever this is socially optimal. However,
the regulator is not able to enforce optimal allocation between the two ﬁrms
when it is socially optimal for both ﬁrms to produce. I shall brieﬂy outline
the argument. The ﬁrms have the same technologies as in Section 4.6.1 but
now set prices denoted by p1 and p2 rather than quantities. To determine the
ﬁrm’s demand, I follow the standard Bertrand model: If ﬁrms charge prices





G(pi) if pi <p j ,
Gpi)/2 if pi = pj ,
0 if pi >p j ,
(54)
where G(p) is the market demand function.17 This deﬁnition is based on
the assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the prices, that
they always buy from the cheaper ﬁrm if prices diﬀer and split up equally
if prices are equal, and that the ﬁrms are not capacity-constrained. The
ﬁrms’ demand functions will be diﬀerent if we consider regulation by permits,
which naturally imposes capacity-constraints on the ﬁrms. This will lead us
to Bertrand—Edgeworth rather than Bertrand competition and will require
a rationing rule. I will return to that case in Section 7.3. In a price-setting
game like this, it is well-known that for symmetric ﬁrms there is a unique
Bertrand—Nash equilibrium where ﬁrms charge a price equal to marginal cost.
Where, say, c1 <c 2 and c2 <p m
1 ,i nw h i c hpm
1 is ﬁrm 1’s monopoly price,
I follow the industrial organization literature and take p1 = p2 = c2 as the
unique Bertrand—Nash equilibrium price. Hence I will call p =m i n {pm
i ,c j}
the Bertrand equilibrium price if ci <c j.
Suppose now that a uniform linear tax is imposed on emissions such that
the ﬁrm’s marginal cost amounts to ci +δiτ.I fpm
i (τ): =argmaxp{[p−(ci +
τδi)]G(p)} denotes the monopoly price under an emission tax, the market
price under Bertrand competition is given by
p(τ)=m i n {cj + τδj,p
m
i (τ)}. (55)
From this it can readily be seen that the regulator can always induce only
one ﬁrm to produce if it is optimal to do so. In this case, the regulator can
even induce the ﬁrst-best outcome by setting the tax equal to
τ =m a x
½















when it is optimal for only ﬁrm i to produce. Note that the ﬁrst term in
the bracket refers to the case where the ﬁrm to be regulated engages in
limit-pricing, while the second term refers to monopoly pricing.A s m e n -
tioned above, the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot be induced if it is optimal for
17Iu s et h el e t t e rG for demand instead of D as usually found in textbooks, since I
reserve D for the damage function.
40both ﬁrms to produce, because in this case the social optimum requires the












Setting the tax rate equal to marginal damage would induce identical mar-
ginal costs. The demand would then split up equally among the ﬁrms, and
this does not necessarily correspond to the socially optimal allocation. Re-
quate [1993c] characterizes the second-best optimal tax for such a case in
more detail. The tax rate turns out to be discontinuous. Note also that,
contrary to the Cournot case, the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot be induced by
a tax-subsidy system in the Bertrand case.
5.2 Price-Setting Duopoly with Diﬀerentiated Com-
modities
Lange and Requate [1999] study price setting duopoly with diﬀerentiated
commodities. They ﬁnd that the results obtained previously, i.e. that the
second-best optimal tax rate should be set below marginal social damage, is
not corrupted under imperfect price competition unless ﬁrms are extremely
diﬀerent. This holds true irrespective of whether the commodities are substi-
tutes or complements. Only if the ﬁrms are extremely diﬀerent with respect
to both their technology and their market demand functions, is it possible
for the second-best optimal tax rate to exceed marginal social damage.
5.2.1 Outline of the Model
There are two ﬁrms oﬀering diﬀerentiated commodities. The utility of a
representative consumer is given by a separable quasi-linear utility function
u = U(q1,q 2)+q0 − D(e1,e 2) (56)
where commodity 0 is a numeraire with the price normalized to one. The
subutility function U is quasi—concave and monotonically increasing. Further
assumptions are imposed on the Marshallian demand functions for the two
commodities 1 and 2.W e u s e e1 and e2 to denote the ﬁrms’ emissions, as
deﬁned below. D(e1,e 2) denotes the disutility (or damage) caused by the
pollution from the two ﬁrms. The utility-maximizing consumer clearly sets
Ui ≡ ∂U(q1,q 2)/∂qi = pi where pi is the price of commodity i.L e tGi(p1,p 2)
41denote the solution of this problem, i.e. the demand for commodity i. The
two commodities are substitutes (complements) if Gi
j ≡ ∂Gi/∂pj > 0( < 0)
holds. Further, the authors assume that Gi
i ≡ ∂Gi/∂pi < 0, and that ﬁrm i’s
revenue pi · Gi is concave in pi.
The ﬁrms produce with constant marginal costs ci ≥ 0, and generate
pollution ei = δiqi proportional to output. If the ﬁrms have to pay an
individual tax τi (which may be uniform as a special case), the ﬁrms’ proﬁt
is given by
π
i(p1,p 2)=( pi − ci − δiτi)G
i(p1,p 2) .( 5 7 )
5.2.2 Diﬀerentiated Emission Taxes
The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous price-setting game is then deter-
mined by the following set of equations:
G
i(p1,p 2)+( pi − ci − δiτi)G
i
i(p1,p 2)=0 for i =1 ,2 .( 5 8 )
The comparative static eﬀects of diﬀerentiated t a x e sa r eq u i t ei n t u i t i v e .
Proposition 1 i) ∂pi/∂τi > 0 for i =1 ,2. ii) ∂pi/∂τj > 0 if commodities
are substitutes and ∂pi/∂τj < 0 if commodity i is a complement to commodity
j.
















where ηi = −Gi
ipi/Gi denotes the demand elasticity for commodity i.
Note that formula (59) provides the same structure for the second-best
optimal tax rates as in the pure monopoly case (see Section 3). Of course, the
two rules for τ1 and τ2 given by (59) are not independent of each other. But if
both marginal damage and demand elasticity are known or can be determined
empirically, rule (59) is easy to handle if taxes can be diﬀerentiated, especially
if the two ﬁrms supplying diﬀerent commodities emit diﬀerent pollutants.
5.2.3 Uniform Emission Tax
If the regulator can set a uniform tax only, the comparative static eﬀects are
less clear-cut. Lange and Requate obtain the following result:
42Proposition 2 i) If the commodities are substitutes, both prices will increase
if the tax rate goes up. ii) If the commodities are complements and the ﬁrms
have asymmetric cost and demand structures, one of the prices may go down.
























.( 6 0 )
If the pollutant is uniform, i.e. if D(e1,e 2)=e D(e1 +e2) implying ∂D/∂e1 =
∂D/∂e2 = e D0,w eo b t a i n
















.( 6 1 )
If ﬁrms are suﬃciently similar, i.e. G1 ≈ G2 and G1
1 ≈ G2
2 as well as δ1 ≈ δ2,
the formula for the optimal tax rate approximates





.( 6 2 )
Note that this is independent of whether the two commodities are comple-
ments or substitutes.
If ﬁrms are extremely diﬀerent, however, the second term on the right
hand side of (61) taking accounting of the strategic interaction between the
ﬁrms may be positive, resulting in a second-best optimal tax rate that exceeds
marginal damage. Lange and Requate [1999] present a numerical example
where this is in fact the case. The reason for the high tax rate in that example
is ﬁrm 1’s extreme advantage with respect to private cost. In order to oﬀset
this advantage and to cut down emissions, the regulator has to choose a tax
rate that is higher than marginal damage.
6 Monopolistic Competition and Free Entry
In this section I summarize models of imperfect competition where the num-
ber of ﬁrms is determined endogenously. The industrial organization liter-
ature oﬀers three prototype models of this kind: Cournot competition with
free entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz model of product diﬀerentiation, and Salop’s
43model of the circular city. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [1995], Requate
[1997], and S.-H. Lee [1999] all investigate the Cournot model with free en-
t r yb yp o l l u t i n gﬁrms. Lange and Requate [2000] discuss the two remaining
models of monopolistic competition. In all these papers, the authors pro-
ceed on the assumption that an emission tax is the only policy instrument
available to the regulator. Therefore it is important to emphasize that this
instrument now has to deal with three market imperfections: ﬁrms pollute,
their prices are higher than is socially optimal, and the number of ﬁrms is
not optimal (in general). In particular, the Cournot model leads to excessive
market entry by ﬁrms in the absence of regulation. Therefore it may be the
case that the second-best optimal tax rate exceeds marginal social damage,
which contrasts with the results obtained so far.
6.1 Emission Taxes in Cournot Oligopoly with Free
Entry
The material of this subsection is based on Requate [1997]. Katsoulacos
and Xepapadeas [1995] study a special case of this model, assuming linear
demand and a cost function additively separable into output and emissions.
S.-H. Lee [1999] replicates the results of Requate [1997] focusing on the case
where pollution is proportional to output. Here, we will study both cases, i.e.
where ﬁrms have abatement technologies and where emissions are completely
determined by output. For the latter case we obtain the neat result that the
second-best optimal tax rate equals marginal damage if demand is linear.
6.1.1 Basic Assumptions and the Firms’ Behavior
Throughout this section I assume that ﬁrms are symmetric.18 Since the
number of ﬁrms is determined endogenously by a zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n ,w e
need to explicitly take account of ﬁxed costs. Hence I write the costs as
C(q)=v(q)+F if emissions are proportional to output, i.e. e = δ · q,a n d
C(q,e)=v(q,e)+F if the cost function satisﬁes Assumption 4.
18In models of free entry this is a standard assumption. It can be justiﬁed by arguing,
ﬁr s tt h a to n l yﬁrms using technologies inducing the lowest average costs will prevail, and
second, that if several technologies are randomly drawn from a continuous distribution of
parameters, it is extremely unlikely that two diﬀerent technologies will induce the same
average cost.
44Further, I only consider the case where the regulator moves ﬁrst by making
a commitment to his tax rate. In the second stage, ﬁrms decide whether or
not to enter the market, and in the third stage they engage in Cournot
competition. For the case where emissions are proportional to output, the
Nash equilibrium condition in the last stage (assuming the existence of an







∗) − τδ =0 .( 6 3 )
In the second stage of the regulation game, a number n∗of ﬁrms enters the





∗) − F − τδq
∗ =0 .( 6 4 )
If abatement is possible, i.e. if the ﬁrms’ cost functions satisfy Assumption 4,
a Nash equilibrium in the last stage (again assuming an interior equilibrium
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6.1.2 The Government’s Problem
Employing the usual procedure of welfare maximization leads to the following






.( 6 8 )
The sign of dE/dτ is ambiguous in general. However, one can derive the
following result:
Proposition 6 Under symmetric oligopoly with free entry where the ﬁrms’
technologies satisfy Assumption 4, the second-best optimal emission tax rate
exceeds marginal social damage if
i) vqe =0and P is (weakly) convex,
or if
ii) vqeq + veee ≥ 0 and P is linear.
19Our assumptions guarantee that an equilibrium exists and that it is unique and stable.
45In the case of emissions proportional to output, one can even show that
the following holds:
Proposition 7 In a symmetric oligopoly with free entry and emissions pro-






The second-best optimal tax rate
a) exceeds marginal damage if demand is strictly concave,
b) falls short of marginal damage if demand is strictly convex,
c) is equal to marginal damage if demand is linear.
We see that if no abatement technology exists, the second-best optimal
emission tax rate equals marginal damage for linear demand despite imper-
fect competition. Thus we obtain the same result as under perfect competi-
tion, which again is interesting in the light of Buchanan’s [1969] early attack
on the Pigouvian tax rule. This result also contrasts with Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas [1995], who ﬁnd that for linear demand the second-best opti-
mal tax rate exceeds marginal damage if the marginal abatement costs are
independent of the level of output.
Note that in the case where no abatement technology exists we consider
a situation where the regulator has only one instrument to regulate two
market imperfections: the wrong quantity of output (and hence pollution),
plus excessive entry by ﬁrms. Little can be said in general about whether
output is too high or too low. On the one hand, individual ﬁrms hold down
output due to imperfect competition; on the other, individual ﬁrms do not
account for the social damage caused by pollution, which in this case is
strictly proportional to output.
If the number of ﬁrms were ﬁxed or regulated by another device, such
as a license scheme (as is the case in many taxi markets), the regulator
could implement the ﬁrst-best outcome precisely by taxing either emissions
or output.
In the case of free entry, however, the potential rents earned by virtue of
imperfect competition attract more ﬁrms. Since there is excessive entry by
46ﬁrms, they produce and thus pollute to a higher degree than is optimal, and
they dissipate ﬁxed costs. To mitigate this excess entry eﬀect, the regulator
has to set the second-best optimal tax rate higher than in the case where the
number of ﬁrms is exogenous. Whether this tax rate is higher or lower than
marginal damage, depends, as we have seen, on the curvature of the inverse
demand function.
Note that in the case where demand is linear and emissions are propor-
tional to output (Proposition 7), we can neither conclude that the emission
tax implements the ﬁrst-best outcome nor that the second-best optimal emis-
sion tax rate regulating an oligopoly with an endogenous number of ﬁrms is
the same as for regulating a competitive market. Since under imperfect
competition the ﬁrms price higher than marginal cost, they produce less
and accordingly also pollute less than under perfect competition. Hence,
in oligopoly with an endogenous number of ﬁrms and linear demand, the
second-best optimal tax rate has to be set lower than in the case of perfect
competition.
The results summarized so far have been derived under the assumption
that all the existing ﬁrms are identical. Requate [1997] also discusses the case
of several possible technologies. Even though generically only one technology
will survive, there may exist other potential, possibly cleaner technologies
that may be used if a suitable environmental policy is implemented. Requate
[1997] shows that for at most one particular tax rate two diﬀerent ﬁrms can
be active at the same time. However, although from a social point of view it
may be optimal for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms to share the market, a regulator
will not in general be able to enforce the desired technology mix by setting an
appropriate Pigouvian tax. The reason is that under free entry a multiplicity
of equilibria exists. The various equilibria, however, lead to diﬀerent levels
of pollution, some with excessive, others with too little pollution.20
6.2 Standards
In this section we brieﬂy investigate standards in oligopoly with free en-
try. We start with absolute emission standards and then look at relative
standards. I only consider the case where the ﬁrms’ technologies satisfy As-
sumption 4.
20This phenomenon does not depend on the assumption of imperfect competition but
also materializes under perfect competition. See Requate [1995], Requate and Unold [2001]
and [2003].
476.2.1 Absolute Emission Standard
In addition to the ﬁrst-order Nash equilibrium condition (52), the zero-proﬁt




P0Cqeq − Ce[P0 + P00q]




(n − 1)P0Cqeq + Ce[(n +1 ) P0 + nP 00q − Cqq]
P0q[2P0 + P00q − Cqq]
> 0
The last eﬀect implies that a stricter emission standard leads to market exit.
By contrast, the eﬀect on output is ambiguous.














This gives us the following result:
Proposition 3 If a Cournot oligopoly with free entry is regulated by an ab-
solute emission standard, then




d¯ e < 0, then it will exceed marginal damage.
6.2.2 Relative Standards
Next I consider the eﬀect of a relative standard restricting units of emissions
per output: e ≤ αq. If the standard is binding, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts can be
written as P(Q)q − C(q,αq). The equilibrium is now given by the Nash





−Ce[P0 + P00q]+P0(Ce + q(Cqe + αCee)




Ce[nP 00q +( n +1 ) P0 − (Cqq +2 αCqe + Cee)]
P0q[P00q +2 P0 − (Cqq +2 αCqe + Cee)]
−
−(n +1 ) P0[Ce + q(Cqe + αCee)]
P0q[P00q +2 P0 − (Cqq +2 αCqe + Cee)]
48Now both dq/dα and dn/dα are completely ambiguous. However, the change







Ce[P0 − (Cqq +2 αCqe + Cee)] + P0[Ce + q(Cqe + αCee)]]
P0q[P00q +2 P0 − (Cqq +2 αCqe + Cee)]
This term cannot be signed in general but is positive for quadratic cost
functions.21















If we compare the term for dq/dα to dQ/dα, we see that dQ/dα is larger
than dq/dα if P00 ≤ 0 or |P00| is suﬃciently small. Hence, if dq/dα is




dαD0(E) dominates the term P0(Q)
dq
dα, which accounts for the distortion
resulting from imperfect competition. The intuition here is that the oligopoly
rent attracts more ﬁrms than is optimal, and due to the relative standard
more ﬁrms induce more pollution. Therefore the standard has to be set more
strictly than in the case where the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, meaning
that the marginal abatement costs exceed marginal damage.
6.3 The Dixit—Stiglitz Model
In this subsection, I present the implications for environmental policy in
the prototype model of imperfect price competition with free entry, i.e. the
Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence model. I extend that model by assuming that the diﬀer-
entiated commodity is produced by emitting a pollutant that is proportional
to output. The pollutant is subject to taxation. The social damage is mea-
sured in units of the numeraire commodity. We establish that the second-best
optimal tax rate is always lower than marginal damage. Contrasting with the
Cournot model this suggests that the Dixit-Stiglitz model does not lead to
excess entry in a way requiring the regulator to set a tax rate above marginal
damage. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the more competition we have, the closer
21If C(q,e)=[ βq − e]2/2, then the last term boils down to Cqe + αCee = α − β which
is smaller than zero if the relative standard bites, i.e. α<β . All the other terms of the
numerator are positive under the assumptions we make throughout this chapter.
49we should set the second-best optimal tax rate to marginal social damage.
These results hold true under rather general conditions. On the one hand,
the result is quite intuitive and is in line with what we already know about
the regulation of monopolistic ﬁrms. On the other, the result is not com-
pletely obvious in the light from the ﬁndings from the Cournot model with
free entry.
6.3.1 Outline of the Model
In the Dixit-Stiglitz model, the representative consumer draws utility from
n+1commodities, a compound commodity I that is supplied in n diﬀerent
varieties, and a numeraire commodity 0. The consumer also suﬀers from the
aggregate level of pollution E =
Pn
i=1 ei,w h e r eei is the amount of pollution
generated by ﬁrm i. The damage from pollution, measured in units of the











,q 0 − D(E)

,
where q0 = M−
Pn
i=1 piqi+τEis the consumption of the numeraire commod-
ity, i.e. gross income M m i n u se x p e n d i t u r e sf o rt h ec o m m o d i t i e si =1 ,...,n,
plus tax revenues that are redistributed to the consumer in a lump sum way.
The price for commodity i is denoted by pi, while the price for commodity 0
is normalized to 1.
Moreover, it is usually assumed that the numeraire commodity 0 and the
compound commodity I are normal goods. Then utility maximization leads











i UI for i =1 ,...,n .
where U0 and UI are the partial derivatives of utility with respect to the
numeraire and the compound commodity, respectively. If n is large, a change
of price pi and thus a change in demand for commodity i has little eﬀect on Pn
j=1 q
ρ
j and hence little eﬀect on U0 and UI.22 Accordingly, the demand for
commodity i can be approximated by




22See Tirole [1988], pp. 298-299.
50where k is a constant.
The ﬁrms produce at constant marginal cost c>0 and incur ﬁxed costs
F>0. To keep the model simple, pollution is assumed to be proportional to
output. Therefore without loss of generality we can identify pollution with
output. If the government charges a tax τ on pollution, a typical ﬁrm’s proﬁt
—i fi td e c i d e st oe n t e rt h em a r k e t—i sg i v e nb y













,( 7 1 )
where s =1 /ρ − 1. Thus a symmetric equilibrium consisting of a price
p,aﬁrm’s output q, and the number of ﬁrms n as endogenous variables is














,( 7 4 )
where, using (71) and employing symmetry in the consumption of the diﬀer-
entiated goods, the expressions A and B are deﬁned as:














We are now ready to investigate the comparative statics eﬀects of raising the
tax rate and look for the structure of the second-best optimal tax rate.
516.3.2 The Eﬀect of Increasing the Tax Rate
One interesting aspect is the question of how an introduction or increase of
an emission (or output) tax aﬀects the endogenous variables of the model.
Unfortunately, these eﬀe c t sa r eq u i t ea m b i g u o u s . I tm a ye v e nb et h ec a s e
that both the number of ﬁrms and total emissions will rise as a result of
increasing the emission tax.23 If we assume a fully quasi-linear utility function
by specifying
U(q0 − D(E),q I)=q0 − D(E)+V (qI),
where qI = n1/ρq,we can say rather more about the relationship between
the size of the tax rate and the number of ﬁrms.




dn/dτ < 0 if and only if 0 < 1 − η<ρ
Note, however, that if we assume that demand for each particular product
decreases as the number of ﬁrms goes up, i.e. product diversity increases
(the price being held ﬁxed), it follows that24
1 − η − ρ<0 (75)
If we further assume that η<1,25 we obtain n0 < 0. Both assumptions
together also guarantee the existence of a ﬁnite number of products (=ﬁrms)
in the ﬁrst-best allocation, given an arbitrary social damage function. Hence
dn/dτ < 0 is more likely to hold, although dn/dτ > 0 cannot be excluded.
6.3.3 The Second-Best Optimal Tax Rate
We are now able to make a general statement about the second-best optimal
tax rate:
23Lange and Requate (2000) provide a numerical example for such a case.
24Dixit and Stiglitz [1976], p.298, refer to this assumption in their original model as the
“natural” case.
25This assumption corresponds to price elasticity of demand for the compound commod-
ity that is greater than 1. Assume for a moment that n ﬁrms collude and jointly maximize
their proﬁts. Then η<1 is a necessary condition for guaranteeing the existence of a joint
proﬁtm a x i m u m .
52Proposition 8 If in the Dixit—Stiglitz model pollution is proportional to out-
put and the emission tax is the government’s only regulatory device, the
second-best optimal emission tax rate is smaller than marginal social damage.
Interestingly, it is not possible to obtain a rule similar to the case of
monopoly or oligopoly stating that the “tax rate is equal to marginal so-
cial damage plus a (negative) term taking account of imperfectly competitive
behavior”. Rather, one can show that c+τ
c+D0 is smaller than one, implying
τ<D 0. In contrast to the Cournot model this suggests that the Dixit-
Stiglitz model does not lead to excess entry in a way requiring the regulator
to set a tax above marginal social damage. Note that a complete analysis
of excess entry at this stage is not possible. In general there are several
conﬂicting forces that lead to a deviation from the social optimal level in
the number of ﬁrms. Spence [1976] analyzes the problem of excess entry in
a standard model of monopolistic competition, i.e. without social damage
caused by production. Even in this context, the question of excess entry
cannot be answered generally but only for some special cases. In addition, in
our model the impact of an increase in the tax rate on the number of ﬁrms
is ambiguous. Hence we are not able to compare the number of ﬁrms to the
socially optimal level.
For the case of quasi-linear utility functions, Lange and Requate [1999]
show the following neat convergence result:
Proposition 9 Assume that 1 − η − ρ<0 for ρ close to one. Then, the
higher the degree of competition, i.e. the better substitutes the goods are (the
closer ρ is to one), the closer the second-best optimal tax rate is to marginal
social damage. In the limit, i.e. ρ =1 , when the commodities become perfect
substitutes, the second-best optimal tax rate coincides with marginal social
damage.
The results obtained in this section conﬁrm generally accepted wisdom on
second-best taxation for imperfect competition, i.e. the second-best optimal
tax rate falls short of marginal social damage but converges to it as competi-
tion gets tougher. On the one hand, this result is satisfactory since it does not
contradict our knowledge about second-best taxation of a monopolist; after
all, pure monopolies rarely exist since every monopolist competes with other
ﬁrms in some way. On the other hand, the result is not trivial, since from
Cournot competition with free entry we know that the second-best optimal
53emission tax rate may exceed marginal damage with a view to mitigating
excess entry.
6.4 Salop’s Model of the Circular City
However, if the goods under consideration are physically identical but only
diﬀer with respect to their location, the conclusion in Proposition 8 does not
necessarily hold in general. To show this, Lange and Requate [1999] discuss
an extended version of Salop’s model of the circular city. For this purpose the
authors slightly modify Salop’s original model by relaxing the usual assump-
tion of unit demand, but rather assuming downward sloping demand in order
to obtain variable aggregate output and thus variable pollution (otherwise
environmental policy such as taxation would not be very interesting).
6.4.1 Outline of the Model
Each consumer has elastic demand for the consumption good supplied by
n ﬁrms located on a circle with perimeter 1. Consumers are also located
uniformly on the circle with density one. The utility of a consumer with
distance x to the closest ﬁrm is given by
ux = U(q) − pq − tx ,
where q is the quantity of the commodity consumed, p is its price, and t is the
consumer’s marginal transportation costs. Let q(p) denote the consumer’s
Marshallian demand and V (p): =U(q(p))−pq(p) the consumer’s gross indi-
rect utility function, i.e. the utility disregarding the transportation costs. To
obtain a concave revenue function the authors assume that 2(q0)2 − qq00 > 0
holds.
As in the last section, the ﬁrms are identical, they produce with constant
marginal costs c ≥ 0 and pollute proportional to output. For simplicity we
again identify pollution with output. Given that the ﬁrms are located at
equal distances around the circle and all potential competitors oﬀer the good










where the second term is the share of consumers buying at ﬁrm i.I f t h e
ﬁrms are subject to an emission tax which in this case can also be charged
54on output, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is determined by
π
i(pi,p)=[ pi − c − τ]G
i(pi,p)
=[ pi − c − τ]q(pi)
·







Proﬁt maximization leads to the following ﬁrst-order condition which is also
the Nash-equilibrium condition in the second stage of the game, once the
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+[pi − c − τ]q(pi)
V 0(pi)
t
=0 .( 7 6 )
Using Roy’s identity, i.e. V 0(pi)=−q(pi), and the symmetry of equilibrium
we can write: p = pi and q = q(p).F u r t h e rw ew r i t eq0 := q0(p). Thus, the
ﬁrst order Nash-equilibrium condition (76) becomes







=0 .( 7 7 )
Zero proﬁts yield
(p − c − τ)
q
n
= F .( 7 8 )
6.4.2 The Eﬀect of Increasing the Tax Rate
N o ww ei n v e s t i g a t et h ei m p a c to fr a i s i n gt h ee m i s s i o nr a t e . D i ﬀerentiating
the system (77) and (78) with respect to the tax rate τ,a n ds o l v i n gf o rb o t h




q0 − 2q2 n
t
2q0 − 2q2 n
t +( p − c − τ)(q00 − 3qq0 n
t)
.( 7 9 )
n
0 =
(p − c − τ)(2(q0)2 − qq00)
F
£
2q0 − 2q2 n
t +( p − c − τ)(q00 − 3qq0 n
t)
¤ .( 8 0 )
The denominators are clearly negative by the ﬁrms’ second-order conditions
of proﬁt maximization. Thus p0 > 0. S i n c ew eh a v ef u r t h e ra s s u m e dt h a tt h e
ﬁrms’ revenue is concave, i.e. 2(q0)2 − qq00 > 0,w eo b t a i nn0 < 0.T h u st h e
price rises and the number of ﬁrms fall if the emission tax is raised, as we
would have expected.
556.4.3 The Second-Best Optimal Tax Rate
We now turn to the regulator’s problem. If we again assume that the tax is
the only instrument available to the regulator, she or he maximizes welfare
deﬁned as follows




sds − cq(p) − nF − D(q(p)) ,( 8 1 )
where p and n, determined by (77) and (78), are functions of the tax rate.
Note that the second term on the right hand side of (81) takes account of
the consumers’ transportation costs. It is easy to calculate that this term is
equal to t
4n.













.( 8 2 )
Since up to now we have not made use of the zero-proﬁt condition in this
subsection, we immediately obtain the following result:
Proposition 10 If the number of ﬁrms is ﬁx e do ri far e g u l a t o rh a sd i r e c t
control over it, for example by a licence scheme, the second-best optimal tax




q0 − q2 n
t
(83)
and thus falls short of marginal damage.
Let us now get back to the case where the regulator has no direct control
over n. Since the second term of (82) is clearly negative and both n0 < 0
and p0 > 0 hold, the second best tax rate falls short of marginal damage
if F< t
4n2. However, Lange and Requate [1999] show by example that
in equilibrium the last inequality may also be reversed. Thus the second-
best optimal tax rate may exceed of fall short of marginal damage. Thus
paralleling the Cournot model, there is excessive entry in the extended version
of the Salop model. Since the second-best optimal emission tax has to correct
for three market imperfections, i.e. pollution, too little output per ﬁrm, and
too many ﬁrms entering the market, the latter may be suﬀ
567 Permit Trading in Oligopoly
In standard oligopoly theory, the ﬁrms’ technologies are represented by their
cost functions. In doing so, one implicitly assumes that the ﬁrms behave
as price-takers in all factor markets. If an industry is regulated by issuing
tradable permits, those permits can be considered an additional input. If the
ﬁrms behave competitively on the market for permits, the price for permits
has the same impact as an emission tax on the ﬁrms. In the fully competitive
model, the regulator could issue a suitable number of permits instead of
charging an emission tax. Firms, however, will only behave as price-takers
if the number of ﬁrms is large. Since in oligopoly the number of ﬁrms is
small by deﬁnition, competitive behavior on the permit market can only
be justiﬁed if there are other ﬁrms outside the oligopolistic industry that
operate on the same permit market. For pollutants arising in many diﬀerent
production processes, such as CO, CO2, NOx and others, this will certainly
be a realistic assumption. However, in some industries, for example the
chemical industry, pollutants are emitted that are speciﬁct ot h a ti n d u s t r y ,
i.e. the few competitors on the output market are the only emitters of a
certain pollutant. In this section, I discuss this kind of industry structure.
In the next subsection I start with a duopoly model, then going on to discuss
why it is diﬃcult to extend the approach to more than two ﬁrms.
7.1 Cournot Duopoly
I begin my discussion with Cournot competition, presenting an adapted ver-
sion of von der Fehr’s [1993] model.26 Requate [1993a] independently de-
velops a similar model, assuming, however, that the ﬁrms’ technologies are
linear.27 We proceed on the assumption that the government issues (grand-
fathers) a number of permits denoted by L. The process in the economy can
be divided into two stages. Initially, the ﬁr m sh o l da ne n d o w m e n t(l1,l 2) of
permits with l1+l2 = L.I nt h eﬁrst stage, they are allowed to trade, i.e. one
ﬁrm sells some or all permits to the other ﬁr m . F i r m st h u se n du pw i t ha
new allocation of permits e =( e1,e 2) where e1+e2 = L. In the second stage,
ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition and choose quantities q1(e), q2(e) given
26In fact, von der Fehr’s model is slightly more general since he allows for quantity
competition with diﬀerentiated products.
27This means that ﬁrms have constant marginal costs and emissions are proportional to
output.
57the allocation of permits e =( e1,e 2).
Writing Q(e)=q1(e)+q2(e), a Cournot—Nash equilibrium (q1(e),q 2(e))




q(qi(e),e i) ≤ 0 [=0if qi(e) > 0],
if C
i




q(qi(e),ˆ ei) ≤ 0 [=0if qi(e) > 0]
if ∃ ˆ ei <e i such that C
i
e(qi(e),ˆ ei)=0, i =1 ,2.
Note that we have to allow for corner solutions here because one ﬁrm might
buy all the permits from the other ﬁrm. If ﬁrm i produces, i.e., qi(e) > 0,a n d
the permit constraint is binding, the ﬁrst-order (Nash equilibrium) conditions
reduce to
P
0(Q(e)) · qi(e)+P(Q(e)) − C
i
q(qi(e),e i)=0 for i =1 ,2.( 8 4 )
To ﬁgure out how the ﬁrms will trade the permits in the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,w eh a v e
to study the gains from trade. For this purpose we use ΠN
i (e1,e 2) to denote
the proﬁto fﬁrm i if the ﬁnal allocation of permits in the ﬁrst stage is (e1,e 2)
and both ﬁrms choose Nash quantities in the second stage. Observe that
starting from any allocation (l1,l2) a gain from trade will be fully conditional









2 (e1,e 2) .
In this case there exists a real number T that is interpreted as a transfer





1 (l1,l 2) ,
Π
N
2 (e1,e 2) − T>Π
N
2 (l1,l 2) .
This is the same procedure as in the model for several local monopolists (see
subsection 3.5.3). We do not need to bother about how the ﬁrms ﬁgure out
T. For example, they could agree on the Nash—bargaining solution. The










s.t. e1 + e2 ≤ L, e1 ≥ 0, e2 ≥ 0.( 8 5 )
On the assumption that ﬁr m sb e h a v ea sp r o ﬁt-maximizers, it is natural
to make the following assumption:




Note that this assumption also allows for the case of one ﬁrm buying all
the other ﬁrm’s permits and thus resulting in a monopoly on the market.
Observe further that the solution of (85) does not depend on the initial
allocation (l1,l 2), in contrast, of course, to the ﬁnal proﬁts (net transfer
payments). But we need not be concerned about this as the distribution of
proﬁts among the ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect welfare.
Thus, by virtue of the institutional permit-market framework, cooperation
becomes feasible to a limited degree. Since by anti—trust laws it is usually
forbidden for ﬁrms to sign binding contracts to maximize joint industry prof-
its, ﬁrms can do no better than choosing Nash quantities. However, if ﬁrms
buy or sell pollution permits, they implicitly commit either to a direct capac-
ity constraint - in case that pollution is strictly proportional to output and
no additional abatement technologies exist - or to extremely high production
costs which amounts to an indirect capacity constraint. Hence, by trading
permits, the ﬁrms can achieve joint maximization of Cournot—Nash proﬁts.
I shall not work out the maximization problem of (85) here. It is important
to note, however, that for no solution of (85) can it be the case that both
ﬁrms hold permits and at the same time the permit constraint is not binding
on one of the ﬁrms. Otherwise a ﬁrm i would have idle pollution capacity and
would engage at the same time in Cournot competition with the other ﬁrm.
In this case, ﬁrm i could increase its proﬁts by buying all the permits from
ﬁrm j, thus establishing a monopoly position. On the other hand, monopoly
does not necessarily maximize total industry proﬁts as if both ﬁrms incur
sharply increasing marginal production costs, it might be more proﬁtable for
both of them to share both the permits and production with one another,
despite Cournot competition in the second stage.
Solving the regulator’s problem is quite a complicated matter due to the
sequential nature of the ﬁrms’ game. One can show, however, that if the
ﬁrms trade the permits so that they both hold permits in equilibrium, the














= λ = −C
i
e(q2(e(L)),e 2(L))
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to constraint e1+e2 = L and
∂qi/∂ej is the reaction of ﬁrm i with respect to output if ﬁrm j obtains more
permits. Note that if the term in curled brackets is positive for one ﬁrm, it
must be negative for the other ﬁrm, since ∂qi/∂ej = −∂qi/∂ei.T h i si m p l i e s
that in general we will have
−C
1
e(q1(L),e 1(L)) 6= −C
2
e(q2(L),e 2(L))
i.e. the ﬁrms do not level out their marginal abatement costs. In the ﬁrst
stage of the game, for strategic reasons the ﬁrms commit to an ineﬃcient
distribution of permits and thus to an ineﬃcient cost structure in order to
commit to lower output, thus extracting a higher rent in the second stage of
the game when they engage in Cournot competition. The Lagrange multiplier
λ can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of shifting a permit from one
ﬁrm to the other. Accordingly, it is the oligopolistic industry’s shadow price
for pollution.
Von der Fehr [1993] emphasizes that allowing for trade may in fact be
welfare-decreasing since it leads to monopolization in the permit market.
Sartzetakis and McFetridge [1999] oﬀer a graphical analysis illustrating how
permit trading in duopoly aﬀects and shifts the ﬁrms’ reaction curves in the
output market.
7.2 Welfare Comparison between Permits and Taxes
The fact that in general, marginal abatement costs are not equalized across
ﬁrms if they trade permits strategically, does not however necessarily im-
ply that regulating duopoly by permits is, in general, more ineﬃcient than
regulation by emission taxes. To see this, consider the simple linear model
developed in Requate [1993a] where ﬁrm 1 has lower marginal costs c1 <c 2
but emits more pollutants per unit of output, i.e. δ1 >δ 2. Assume that
the social damage function is relatively steep so that it is socially optimal
60for the "cleaner" ﬁrm 2 to serve almost the whole market, whereas ﬁrm 1
should produce only very little. Under a permit regime it may be optimal
to issue a small number of permits so that ﬁrm 2 does indeed buy almost all
the permits, while under taxes the worse polluting ﬁrm 1 produces too much.
For the case of linear technologies assumed in Section 4.6.1, Requate [1993a]
f u l l yc h a r a c t e r i z e st h er e g i o n sw h e r et a x e sa n dp e r m i t sl e a dt oh i g h e rw e l f a r e ,
depending on a damage parameter that determines the slope of the damage
function. The bottom line of that analysis is that, in general, neither policy
is superior to the other, i.e. for some parameters the second-best optimal
permit policy yields higher welfare than the second-best optimal tax policy,
whereas for other damage parameters the opposite is true.
7.3 Price Competition
If ﬁrms engage in price competition we end up with Bertrand-Edgeworth
rather than Bertrand competition, since ﬁrms face either increasing marginal
costs or they are capacity-constrained if they have linear technologies and
emissions are proportional to output. It is well known that under Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition, pure strategy equilibria do not exist in general. For
the case of linear technologies, however, Requate [1993a] shows that the
ﬁrms trade the permits in such a way that the Cournot outcome is a pure
strategy equilibrium (see Kreps and Scheinkman [1983]). Again, the welfare
comparison with the tax regime is ambiguous.
7.4 Permit Trading and Subsidies on Output
Requate [1993a,c] shows that, in the case of linear technologies, subsidies
on output and permits to regulate emissions always lead to the ﬁrst-best
allocation, irrespective of whether ﬁrms engage in quantity (Cournot) or in
price (Bertrand) competition. The intuition is the same as in the case of
taxes. The regulator has two instruments for dealing with two distorted
decisions. The result does not hold, of course, if ﬁrms are asymmetric and
their technologies satisfy Assumption 4.
7.5 More than Two Firms
In the last few subsections we have considered a model where the ﬁrms trade
the permits in the ﬁrst stage and engage in Cournot competition in the
61second. In the ﬁrst stage, the permits are traded in such away that the joint
Nash proﬁts to be earned in the second stage are maximized. The question
is whether this procedure can be generalized in a natural way to apply to
more than two ﬁrms.
Let there be n ﬁrms, and let (l1,...,l n) be an initial allocation of permits
with
Pn
i=1 li = L.L e te =( e1,...,e n) be a feasible allocation, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 ei =
L. Finally, let ΠN
i (e) denote the proﬁtf o rﬁrm i if each ﬁrm holds ei (many)
permits and all the ﬁrms have chosen Cournot-Nash quantities. Let us further










i=1 ei = L ,
and let e∗ =( e∗
1,...,e ∗
n) be the corresponding maximizer.
Such a procedure, however, presumes that the ﬁrms can commit to their
share e∗
i of permits and do not engage in further trade with other ﬁrms once
that allocation of emissions has been set. The government could set an aggre-
gate pollution quota for certain pollutants, and the ﬁrms may cooperatively
agree on the degree to which each ﬁrm is allowed to pollute within a cer-
tain period of time. The agreement allows for transfer payments between
the ﬁrms. Once the agreement has been signed, no further trade is allowed.
Thus the ﬁr m sc o m m i tt h e m s e l v e st oa na l l o c a t i o no fp e r m i t st h a tr e m a i n s
unaltered for a certain period of time.
However, for most actually existing permit trading regimes the institu-
tional framework is diﬀerent. An agreement about the allocation of permits
cannot be enforced, and it may be proﬁtable for any two given ﬁrms to en-




i (e). In other words, the core of permit allocations may
be empty. Weigel [1992] provides numerical examples of a Cournot market
with three ﬁrms facing linear demand and quadratic cost functions, where
the core is indeed empty. The point is that, by trading permits, two ﬁrms
impose a negative monetary (as opposed to a real) externality on the third
ﬁrm. The negative monetary externality materializes because, by trading the
permits, two ﬁrms can make the cost structure more eﬃcient for each other,
thus gaining a greater market share and inducing the market price to fall,
which hurts the third ﬁrm. Proposing a solution concept for a ﬁnal alloca-
tion of permits if there are more than two ﬁrms is an unresolved problem
requiring further research.
627.6 Extensions
Sartzetakis [1997b] also investigates the interaction between permit markets
and oligopolistic output markets. In contrast to the model presented above,
the author assumes that the permit market is competitive, while on the out-
put market the ﬁrms engage in imperfect competition. Trading permits has
oﬀsetting eﬀects by equalizing marginal abatement costs, but it can make
ineﬃcient ﬁrms more proﬁtable. Sartzetakis shows, however, that the net
welfare eﬀect of permit trading is positive compared to the non-trade situa-
tion.
In an extension of our basic model with completely inelastic permit sup-
ply, von der Fehr [1993] also considers the case where the regulator uses an
increasing supply function of permits. The duopolists can now act strategi-
cally on both the input and the output market. In a two-stage game the ﬁrms
ﬁrst buy the permits, then going on to engage in quantity competition in the
second stage. The main result is that if the ﬁrms’ quantities are strategic
substitutes, the ﬁrms over-invest in emission permits in comparison to the
ﬁrst-best outcome. The reason is that the ﬁrms commit themselves to a low-
cost structure by shifting their reaction curves outwards. This is the usual
eﬀect when ﬁrms can invest in the ﬁrst period to achieve lower production
costs in the second. For price competition the result is ambiguous. But even
in that case, over-investment in emission permits may occur.
iciently strong such that the emission tax has to be set higher and above
marginal damage.
8 Market Power in Input Markets
In this section I study situations where polluting ﬁrms have market power in
some input market. For this purpose I study models where pollution is pro-
portional to one input. I begin with monopsony and then discuss brieﬂyt h e
case of a quantity-demanding (Cournot) oligopsony. The ﬁrms may exercise
market power either in the market for the dirty input or in a market for a
clean input.
8.1 Monopsony Power over a Polluting Input
Ic o n s i d e raﬁrm that is now a price-taker in an output market where p is the
price of the output good. The output is produced by (at least) two inputs
63q = f(x1,x 2), one of which, say input 1, causes pollution proportional to its
quantity e = δx1. The ﬁr mh a sm a r k e tp o w e ri nt h ef a c t o rm a r k e to fi n p u t
1. To model this, I use w1(x1) to denote the supply function in the upstream
sector producing input 1. That sector is assumed to be competitive, i.e. the
suppliers of input 1 act as price-takers. Let Ci(xi) denote the cost function
of the representative ﬁrm in sector i =1 ,2, where we assume C0
i > 0 and
C00
i > 0. The market for input 2 is assumed to be competitive, with the factor
price denoted by w2. Assuming that input 1 is subject to an environmental
tax τ, this ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be written as
Π(x1,x 2)=pf(x1,x 2) − [w1(x1)+τδ]x1 − w2x2












The upstream input suppliers’ ﬁrst-order conditions correspond quite simply
to C0
i(xi)=wi. From this we can even derive the supply function for good
1a sw1(x1)=C0
1(x1). Obviously, w1(x1) is upward-sloping due to increasing
marginal costs of the input suppliers. To ensure that the second-order con-
dition of the monopsonist is satisﬁed, we assume 2w0
1(x1)+w00
1(x1) > 0. This
is a similar condition to (1) for the monopolist’s inverse demand function.
To characterize the social welfare function, we assume a small open econ-
omy with respect to the output market. This allows us to neglect consumer
surplus. This procedure does not restrict the validity of the results in any
way. Thus we have
W = pf(x1,x 2) − C1(x1) − C2(x2) − D(δx1)
Taking into account the monopsonist’s choice of inputs, determined by (86)
and (87) and denoted by x1(τ) and x2(τ), the regulator maximizes W with






This gives us the following result:
64Proposition 5 If a polluting ﬁrm has monopsony power on a market for a
polluting input, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved by levying an input
tax. The optimal tax is lower than marginal damage.
Note that for the size of the tax rate the result does not change if the
regulator taxes the output of the input supplier. Thus, although the input
supplier is a price-taker, the distortion of the monopsonist requires setting
the tax rate below marginal damage. This result is important, as it suggests
that it is not suﬃcient to look at the market structure of the polluting ﬁrm
alone.
8.2 Second-Best Analysis: When Monopsony Power is
E x e r c i s e do v e raC l e a nI n p u t
Things are slightly diﬀerent if the ﬁrm exercises monopsony power over a
non-polluting input but uses another dirty input supplied on a competitive
market. For this purpose we can simply rewrite the above model by assuming
that pollution is equal to the second input: e = δx2.
Dealing with the welfare maximizing exercise as above, one can determine








Diﬀerentiating (86) and (87) with respect to the tax rate, we obtain dx2/dτ <
0, i.e. the output of the polluting input goes down, and thus pollution goes
down as the emission tax rises. The eﬀect on the clean input is, however, am-
biguous. We obtain dx1/dτ < 0 if and only if f12 = ∂2f(x1,x 2)/(∂x1∂x2) > 0,
which is the case for most production functions used in applied work (in par-
ticular in CGE models), such as CES or nested Leontief/CES functions. This
gives rise to the following result for the second-best tax rate.
Proposition 6 Consider a monopsonist exercising monopsony power in a
market for a clean input and using a polluting input that it buys in a com-
petitive factor market. If the regulator can only target the emissions of the
polluting input, the second-best optimal tax rate falls short of (exceeds) mar-
ginal damage if and only if f12 > 0 (f12 < 0).
65This result can be interpreted as follows: If f12 > 0, the level eﬀect due
to a rise in the emission tax dominates the substitution eﬀect, such that
the ﬁrm reduces dirty and clean inputs as the tax rate rises. Hence the
welfare-maximizing regulator does not want to set the tax too high because
the monopsonist produces too little anyway. If f12 < 0 holds, the substitu-
tion eﬀect dominates the level eﬀect. In that case, the welfare-maximizing
regulator will want to set a tax rate that exceeds marginal damage in order
to encourage the monopsonist to substitute the input clean for the dirty one.
8.3 Oligopsonies
The results do not change dramatically when we move from monopsony to
oligopsony. Hence, we will only outline the results here. The model can be
generalized à la Cournot by assuming that the factor price on an input market
depends on the total input demand of several ﬁrms: w1 = w1(x1




1 is the input demand of ﬁrm j. We can summarize the results as
follows:
Proposition 7 Assume n ﬁrms have market power in a factor market. As-
sume the factor is homogenous so that there is only one price.
i) If ﬁrms are symmetric and exercise market power in a market for a
polluting input and if no further abatement technologies exist, the ﬁrst-
best allocation can be achieved by implementing either an input or an
emission tax. The optimal tax rate is lower than marginal damage.
Raising the tax rate lowers pollution.
ii) If either the situation is the same as in i) except that ﬁrms are symmet-
ric, or if ﬁrms exercise market power in a market for a clean input, the
ﬁrst-best allocation can neither be achieved by a uniform input nor by
a uniform emission tax. If ﬁrms are not too diﬀerent, the second-best
optimal tax rate is lower than marginal damage, and raising the tax
rates lowers pollution.
iii) If ﬁrms are suﬃciently diﬀerent with respect to their cost structure,
perverse eﬀects may arise, i.e. pollution may increased be raising the
tax rate, and the second-best tax rate may exceed marginal damage.
668.4 Mixed Structures
We have seen that in situations with market power in an input market, the
second-best optimal tax rate usually falls short of marginal damage. Hence
it is clear that if a ﬁrm exercises market power in both the output and the
i n p u tm a r k e t ,t h ee ﬀects will "add up".28 T h em o r em a r k e tp o w e rt h e r e
is, the lower the second-best tax rate will be. This also holds if we have
either a vertical monopoly or a vertical monopsony chain. Since in this
case the distortions work into the same direction and the total distortion
increases, the second-best optimal emission tax rate designed to regulate a
vertical monopoly or monopsony chain is lower than in the case where there
is market power in one market only.
As set out above, the Pigouvian tax rule also fails to hold for a competitive
ﬁrm if this ﬁrm sells to a monopsonistic downstream ﬁrm or if it buys some
input from a monopolistic upstream ﬁrm. Thus the regulator needs to be
conversant with the complete vertical industry structure when determining
the second-best optimal level of his tax rate. According to my knowledge,
the literature has been silent on market structures as outlined in this section.
8.5 Market Power in Markets for Clean Inputs and
Clean Technology
David & Sinclair [2005] and Requate [2005] study market power in an up-
stream market for abating inputs or for cleaner technology, respectively.
David and Sinclair consider a competitive polluting industry where emis-
sions e(x,w) are a function of output x and abatement input w. The latter
is supplied by an upstream industry, the ﬁrms of which engage in Cournot
competition. If the polluting downstream ﬁrms are taxed and the tax is the
only instrument at the regulator’s disposal, the second-best optimal tax rate
will exceed marginal damage. David and Sinclair [2005] further show that a
voluntary approach to pollution abatement may be doomed to failure unless
some limitations are imposed on the eco-industry’s market behavior.
Requate [2005] discusses a model with a monopolistic R&D ﬁrm develop-
ing new technology for a polluting downstream sector. He also ﬁnds that the
second-best optimal tax rate exceeds marginal social damage if the regulator
c a nm a k ea ne xa n t ec o m m i t m e n tt ot h el e v e lo fh i st a xr a t e .I nb o t hm o d e l s ,
28The eﬀects, of course, do not necessarily add up in a linear way.
67the intuition for the high tax rate is that the upstream sector sets its prices
too high, which leads to an ineﬃciently low purchase of the abating input in
the model by David and Sinclair and to an ineﬃciently low purchase of the
advanced abatement technology in Requate’s model. By raising the tax rate
the regulator enhances demand for the clean input or the new technology,
respectively.
9 Market Power in the Permit Market
So far we have mainly studied imperfect competition in the output mar-
ket. Permit markets have either been assumed to be competitive, or non-
competitive permit markets have been modelled by bargaining between two
or several ﬁrms (see Section 7). If the permit market is small, i.e. if there are
only a small number of traders, there is no competitive demand side. Hence
it is not possible to model a non-competitive permit market with a small
number of ﬁrms, as in a Cournot model and to apply the standard models
on market power in factor markets. However, there are markets with many
small ﬁrms and a few big ﬁrms, e.g. in the US market for SO2 permits (see
Howe 1994). In his inﬂuential paper, Hahn (1984) sets up a stylized model
with many small ﬁrms and a single ﬁrm exercising market power in the mar-
ket for tradable permits. In this section I present a generalized version of the
Hahn model allowing for the presence of several large ﬁrms.
9.1 A Model of Permit Trading with Large and Small
Firms
To model oligopoly power on the permit market, I divide the set of ﬁrms
participating in the permit market into a set of large ﬁrms i =1 ,...,nand a
set of small ﬁrms i = n+1,...,m. This divide is exogenous, which is certainly
a weakness of this approach. But to date the literature has not provided a
viable alternative. Moreover, I intend to neglect the output market in this
section. Hence we can represent the ﬁrms, whether small or large, by their
abatement cost functions Ci(ei). Each ﬁrm owns an initial endowment of per-
mits, denoted by ˆ ei. Accordingly, we are studying a system of grandfathered
permits. A typical ﬁrm’s total costs can then be written as
Ci(ei)+σ · [ei − ˆ ei]
68where σ is the market price for permits.
The small ﬁrms act as price-takers and thus set their marginal abatement




Accordingly, emissions ei of the small ﬁrms can be written as ei(σ) and can
be interpreted as the factor demand for permits. Summing up these demands











The number of permits employed by the competitive sector is the amount
left by the large ﬁrms. Hence,
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· [ei − ˆ ei]
The permits market with large and small ﬁr m si sn o wm o d e l l e di naC o u r n o t -
like way. The ﬁrst-order condition for the cost minimization of a typical large











· [ei − ˆ ei]+σ
Thus, if in equilibrium ei > ˆ ei,t h e n−C0
i(ei) >σ ,a n di fei < ˆ ei then
−C0
i(ei) <σ .This observation leads us immediately to the following result:
69Proposition 8 Consider a permit market with grandfathering.
i) If in equilibrium a large ﬁrm is a net buyer (seller), the large ﬁrm sets
its marginal abatement cost higher (lower) than the permit price.
ii) Only if the large ﬁrms obtain an initial endowment corresponding to the
eﬃcient ﬁnal allocation will permit trading lead to an eﬃcient outcome.
The intuition for i) is the following: A large ﬁrm that wants to buy ad-
ditional permits buys fewer than optimal in order to keep the permit price
low. Thus the net buyer behaves as an oligopsonist (or as a monopsonist if
n =1 ). A large ﬁrm that wants to sell spare permits, sells less than the
eﬃcient amount in order to keep the permit price high. Thus the net seller
b e h a v e sa sa noligopolist (or a monopolist for n =1 ). Trade will only lead
to an eﬃcient outcome if the large ﬁrms’ initial endowments correspond to
their eﬃcient emission levels. In this case, the large ﬁrms do not participate
in trade and cannot distort the market price for permits. This does not gen-
erally imply, however, that large ﬁrms should not participate in trade. Since
t r a d ea l w a y sg o e si nt h er i g h td i r e c t i o n ,i tw i l li m p r o v ee ﬃciency, i.e. the
ﬁnal allocation is less ineﬃcient than the initial allocation. Where legally
and informationally feasible, the regulator should, however, allocate approx-
imately as many permits to the large ﬁrms as they will ultimately need, even
after trade. Maeda [2003] obtains the same results for the case of n =2and
illustrates the model by simulating the international trade in carbon dioxide
allowances, investigating which country is likely to have market power.
9.2 Extensions of the Hahn Model
There are several extensions to this kind of model. They take into account
output markets (Malueg [1990], Innes et al., [1991], and Misiolek and El-
der [1989]) and intertemporal permit trading (Hagem and Westskog, [1998]
and Sartzetakis [1997a] and [1997b]), or they study the possibility of non-
compliance (van Egteren and Weber [1996], Malik [2002], and Chavez and
Stranlund [2003]).
9.2.1 Including the Output Market
Innes et al. [1991] extend the Hahn model by assuming that a large ﬁrm
has market power in both the output and the permit market. They argue
70that, in contrast to Hahn’s result, the big ﬁrm should participate in trade,
and they show that a regime of tradable emission permits is welfare-superior
compared to a regime where both the monopolist and the competitive ﬁrms
are regulated by a uniform tax. Moreover, they show that there exists an
initial allocation of permits that leads to the same ﬁnal allocation of permits
as a discriminating tax system. Under a discriminating tax, the monopolist
needs to be regulated by a lower tax rate than the competitive ﬁrms in
order to mitigate his market power. Allowing the output monopolist to
exercise monopoly power in the permit market as well means that he virtually
faces a lower price for permits than the competitive ﬁrms, which mimics the
discriminating tax system. This leaves us with the question of what is more
diﬃcult: ﬁnding exactly the right initial allocation of permits or ﬁnding
exactly the right discriminating tax rates? Both may be equally diﬃcult.
However, it may be easier to adjust the tax rates than to reallocate the
permits after ﬁrms have engaged in trade.
Misiolek and Elder [1989] extend the Hahn model in a diﬀerent way by
assuming that the (only) large ﬁrm acts as a price-taker in the output market.
Nevertheless, the large ﬁrm takes into consideration how buying permits from
the (small) rival ﬁrms raises those rivals’ costs, aﬀects the output price, and
increases the large ﬁrm’s market share.
Sartzetakis [1997a] takes a similar approach to Misiolek and Elder, assum-
ing, however, that (two) ﬁrms engage in imperfect (Cournot) competition in
the output market. However, there is still one ﬁrm assumed to have market
power in the permit market, whereas the second ﬁrm is a price-taker in the
permit market. In the output market, by contrast, the ﬁrms are symmet-
ric with respect to their behavior, as both of them play the simultaneous
quantity-setting game à la Cournot-Nash. Sartzetakis then discusses a two-
stage game where the large ﬁrm sets the price for permits in the ﬁrst stage. In
the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously decide on both abatement - including
how many permits to buy or sell - and on the quantities of output. Sartze-
takis shows that market power in the permit market can reduce competition
in the output market, a feature also observed in cases where ﬁrms have other
strategic options for raising their rivals’ costs (see Salop and Sheﬀman [1983]
and [1987]). The regulator can mitigate this anti-competitive tendency by
issuing fewer permits to the powerful ﬁrm and more to the weak ﬁrm. The
question remains why the two ﬁrms display diﬀerent behavior in the permit
market but symmetric behavior in the output market.
In a companion paper Sartzetakis [1997b] shows that allowing Cournot
71oligopolists to engage in trade is welfare-improving compared to command
control, where each ﬁrm faces the same absolute emission standard. Sartze-
takis assumes interior solutions such that marginal abatement costs equalize.
Malueg [1990], by contrast, allows for corner solutions and ﬁnds that permit
trading in oligopoly may be welfare-decreasing.
9.2.2 Intertemporal Permit Trading
Hagem and Westskog [1998] draw on Hahn’s [1984] model by including the
intertemporal aspect. In their model there is only one large ﬁrm and it is
always a seller of permits. The authors study a two-period model and com-
pare two diﬀerent permit schemes. In the ﬁrst scheme, all ﬁrms can bank
and borrow permits in an unlimited way. In the second, one permit allows
its holder to emit a constant stream of emissions in each period, a system
the authors refer to as a durable quota system.U n d e r t h e ﬁrst system, all
ﬁrms eﬃciently allocate emissions over time. The monopolist, however, as
in the model described above, sells too few permits, so that his marginal
abatement costs are smaller than those of the competitive ﬁrms. Depending
on the initial allocation of permits, one or the other system may lead to lower
total abatement costs in industry.
9.2.3 Market Power and Non-Compliance
Van Egteren and Weber [1996] extend the Hahn model by considering the
possibility of non-compliance, i.e. ﬁrms emitting pollution in excess of the
number of permits they hold. Firms are audited with a certain probability
and are ﬁned if any cheating is discovered. For the competitive ﬁrms, the
incentive to cheat is higher, the higher the market price is for permits. Hence
the authors ﬁnd that if the (only) large ﬁrm is compliant, a redistribution
of the initial allocation of permits from the competitive ﬁrms to the big ﬁrm
increases the total of violations. If the large ﬁrm is non-compliant, then
clearly the ﬁrm is less likely to cheat if it receives a higher initial allocation
of permits.
Malik [2002] extends the model proposed by van Egteren and Weber [1996]
by investigating the eﬃciency consequences of non-compliance combined with
t h em a r k e tp o w e ro fo n eﬁrm. He shows that in the presence of market power
non-compliance by the small price-taking ﬁrms is potentially desirable. Con-
versely, in the presence of non-compliance, some market power by the (only)
72big ﬁrm is desirable. The reason is that the monopolistic ﬁrm retires some
permits and thus reduces some of the excess pollution emitted in the case
of non-compliance. In my view, the recommendation to maintain monopoly
power in order to mitigate non-compliance by competitive ﬁrms seems rather
strange, as the regulator could in principle mimic the monopolist’s behavior
by issuing a smaller number of permits.
Chavez and Stranlund [2003] complement the work of van Egteren and We-
ber by endogenizing the enforcement of compliance. Whereas Hahn [1984]
ﬁnds that the (only) large ﬁrm should obtain an allocation of permits such
that it does not want to trade, Chavez and Stranlund suggest that the large
ﬁrm should be a buyer (seller) of permits when monitoring costs are increas-
ing (decreasing) in the ﬁrm’s initial endowment of permits.
9.3 Market Power through Innovation
Fisher et al. [2003] consider a model where a single ﬁrm, called the innovator,
is able to invent a new technology that leads to lower (marginal) abatement
costs. Since the innovator needs fewer permits after innovation, the equilib-
rium price for permits decreases. This gives the innovator a degree of market
power. Fisher et al. [2003] do not study the consequences of the allocation of
permits. They ﬁnd, however, that free permits provide fewer incentives for
innovation than auctioned permits. The reason is the endowment eﬀect. The
value of the innovator’s permit endowment depreciates through the invention
of new technology.
Montero [2002a] also studies investment incentives in diﬀerent kinds of
policy instruments, notably tradable permits and two kinds of standards,
emission and performance standards. Besides allowing for perfect and im-
perfect competition in the output market, he - like Innes et al. [1991] -
models imperfect competition in both the output and the permit market. In
the latter case, ﬁr m sn e g o t i a t eo nt h ep e r m i tp r i c e ,a sp r o p o s e di nS e c t i o n7 .
The ﬁrms employ the Nash bargaining solution, taking the level of R&D as
given and anticipating the expected output decisions in the last stage of the
game. Since ﬁrms have market power in both markets, trading permits has
as t r a t e g i ce ﬀect with respect to the output market. This causes the ﬁrms to
invest more under an emission standard and a regime of auctioned permits
than in a regime of free permits.
Montero [2002b] studies both Cournot and price competition with diﬀeren-
tiated products, allowing for R&D spill-overs and again assuming imperfect
73competition both in the output and the permit market. Besides emission
standards and permits he also analyzes emission taxes. Montero ﬁnds that
no strategic eﬀect results from levying an emission tax, as the marginal costs
of both ﬁrms are constant. Taxes can provide more, less, or the same incen-
tive to invest in innovation than/as both emission standards and auctioned
permits, whereas free permits provide fewer incentives to innovate than taxes.
With Bertrand competition in the output market, taxes provide a higher in-
centive than an emission standard, which in turn provides a higher incentive
than free permits. Auctioned permits again can oﬀer more, less or the same
incentive than/as taxes. Montero concludes that in the Cournot case, ei-
ther emission standards, taxes, or auctioned permits can provide the highest
incentive, whereas in the Bertrand case this holds either for taxes or for
auctioned permits.
9.4 Results from Experimental Studies
Given the lack of empirical data for analyzing the eﬃciency of permit mar-
kets, laboratory experiments on permit trading have become an attractive
substitute for empirical ﬁeld investigations on markets for emission allowances.
In particular the Hahn model on monopoly power in permit markets has at-
tracted considerable attention from experimental economists. To my knowl-
edge, Brown-Kruse and Elliott [1990] and Brown-Kruse et al. [1995] were
the ﬁrst to test for market power in emission-trading experiments. In their
experimental treatments a single seller or a single buyer is confronted with
ten buyers and ten sellers, respectively. Godby [2000] extends this approach
including the product market. By setting the product market price either
exogenously or endogenously, he is able to mimic the models developed by
Hahn [1984], Misiolek and Elder [1989], and Innes et al. [1995].29
The experimental design of Godby’s [2000] ﬁrst series of treatments fol-
lows that of Brown-Kruse and Elliott [1990] and Brown-Kruse et al. [1995].
Whereas the large ﬁrm has a production capacity of ten units, each of the ten
fringe ﬁrms can produce only one unit. Pollution is proportional to output.
Thus under a laisser-faire policy, the market would produce and pollute 20
units. The number of emission permits allocated to industry, however, is
29Apparently Godby was not aware of the work done by Innes et al. [1995] since he does
not cite that paper. It is not quite clear from the description of the experimental set-up
whether his treatments are closer to the model of Innes et al. or to that of Misiolek and
Elder [1989].
7410. Godby carries out four diﬀerent treatments. In the ﬁrst two treatments
the product market price is given exogenously, and all the permits are either
allocated to the large ﬁrm (treatment 1) or equally distributed to the fringe
ﬁrms (treatment 2). Thus the big ﬁrm is a net seller in the ﬁrst case and a
net buyer in the second. Since the product market price is exogenous, Godby
calls the big ﬁrm’s manipulation of the permit market simple manipulation.
In the other two treatments the output price is determined endogenously.
Following Misiolek and Elder [1989], Godby calls this kind of market power
exclusionary manipulation, because if the large ﬁrm is a net seller, it has an
incentive to sell fewer permits than is socially optimal for two reasons: it
does not only want to keep the price for permits high and thus earn high
revenues from selling permits, it also wants to increase the product market
price by increasing the production costs of the fringe ﬁrms and thus reducing
supply in the product market. If the big ﬁrm is a net buyer of permits, there
are two oﬀsetting eﬀects. On the one hand, the large ﬁrm has an incentive to
buy fewer permits than is socially eﬃcient in order to hold down the market
price for permits. On the other hand, it wants to raise the competitors’ costs
by buying more permits than would be eﬃcient. For the case of exclusionary
manipulation, Godby again conducts two experiments. In one case, all the
permits are allocated to the large ﬁrm (treatment 3) while in the second the
fringe ﬁrms initially receive all the permits (treatment 4).
Godby extends this design by reducing the number of fringe ﬁrms from
10 to 5 and enhancing their capacity from 1 to 2 units. Thus he also gives
limited market power to the small ﬁrms. The reason for this modiﬁcation is
the empirical observation that the market for NOX permits in Ontario was
governed by an electricity utility that demanded about 50% of the permits,
whereas 5 other ﬁrms, such as producers of iron and steel, cement, etc.,
demanded about 10% each.
Godby [2000] replicates several of the results produced by Brown-Kruse
and Elliott [1990] and Brown-Kruse et al. [1995]. In particular, he ﬁnds
that the prediction of the Hahn model is well conﬁrmed by the experimental
outcomes in treatments 1 and 2, where the price on the output market is
taken as exogenously given. When the large ﬁrm is a seller, the eﬃciency
gain through trade over the initial allocation is approximately 60% - 70%
of the gains that are theoretically achievable through perfect competition.
If the large ﬁrm is a buyer, the eﬃciency loss through market power turns
out to be much smaller (approximately 80% - 95% of the maximal possible
gains). In both treatments the eﬃciency loss is greater when there are only
755f r i n g eﬁrms with high capacity.
Under exclusionary manipulation, by contrast, permit trading results in
negative eﬃciency. Godby establishes an eﬃciency of approximately - 40%
in treatment 3, and of -120 to -140% in treatment 4 (in the latter case, the
eﬃciency loss is even larger for the case of 10 small fringe ﬁrms). In other
words, permit trading turns out to be inferior to command-and-control.
Godby [2002] replicates the analysis of Godby [2000] with one large ﬁrm
holding a capacity of ten units and ﬁve fringe ﬁrms with a capacity of 2 units
each. Compared to his earlier paper he adds two more treatments where
the permits are allocated proportionally to the ﬁrms’ capacities, i.e. the
dominant ﬁrm gets 5, whereas the fringe ﬁrms receive 1 permit each. Using
statistical techniques, Godby [2002] arrives at basically the same results as in
Godby [2000]: In all treatments the hypothesis that the dominant ﬁrm exer-
cises market power cannot be rejected when looking at the end points of the
permit double-auction price series. Product market prices also indicate con-
vergence toward the market power benchmarks. Observed quantities deviate
from competitive levels in the theoretically predicted direction. Moreover,
when exclusionary manipulation is possible, permit trade leads to eﬃciency
losses relative to the command and control benchmark. Finally, Godby ﬁnds
evidence that players engage in speculative behavior.
Muller et al. [2002] carry out similar experiments. They generate market
power on the seller or buyer side by aggregating 5 sellers and 5 buyers,
respectively. They also observe market power in double auctions. Their main
conclusion is that, contrary to the proposals by Smith [1981], the double-
auction design is not as robust with regard to market power.
In contrast to Godby [2000,2002], who avoids any framing, Carlén [2003]
conducts a framed experiment, mimicking the international carbon trade
where the big trader - a buyer - is interpreted as the US. Moreover, in con-
trast to most other laboratory studies, the participants have no chance of
gaining experience. The authors argue that this setting comes closer to in-
ternational permit trading in the ﬁeld. In contrast to the other experiments
referred to here, Carlén does not ﬁnd evidence for distortions through po-
tential market power. Bohm and Carlén [1999] additionally introduce an
information structure to mimic more realistic ﬁeld conditions for the carbon
dioxide emission-permit trading program. However, they do not ﬁnd that
changes in the information structure signiﬁcantly aﬀe c tm a r k e te ﬃciency.
Finally, Cason et al. [2003] also conduct a framed ﬁeld experiment in
order to mimic permit trading of nitrogen allowances among sewage treat-
76ment plants. The novelty of their study is the introduction of asymmetric
information by letting one or two large emitters know the abatement costs
of the small emitters, whereas the small emitters do not know the costs of
the big ones. The authors also test for the impact of diﬀerent initial allo-
cations. They ﬁnd that in a monopoly situation with one large seller the
market price for permits is larger than in the duopoly treatment, although
the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. However, in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings
of Brown-Kruse et al. [1995] and Godby [2000, 2002], they ﬁnd that the
prices, proﬁts, and transaction volumes are much closer to the competitive
equilibrium prediction than to the monopoly or duopoly prediction.
In conclusion, it is worth pointing out that the subject pools participating
in these experiments were mainly students and not real decision-makers.
10 Environmental Policy, Imperfect Compe-
tition, and International Trade
A survey on environmental policy under imperfect competition would cer-
tainly not be complete without addressing the issue of imperfect competition
on international markets. Environmental policy in open economies has be-
come a topic of major interest in environmental economics since Markusen’s
[1975] seminal paper. Assuming that all markets are competitive, Markusen
makes the point that, in the absence of tariﬀs, for example due to a free
trade agreement, emission taxes can be used to inﬂuence the terms of trade
and can thus serve as a substitute for trade policy. As a consequence an
exporting country would like to over-internalize environmental damage in
order to improve its terms of trade. But this implies that with the compet-
itive trade model it is not possible to explain what both environmentalists
and economists refer to as environmental dumping [cf. Rauscher, 1994].
Brander and Spencer [1985] set oﬀ a new direction of research on trade
theory by showing that, under imperfect quantity competition, the optimal
policy consists in making exports cheaper (through subsidies) rather than
improving the terms of trade by making them more expensive (through ex-
p o r tt a x e so ri m p o r tt a r i ﬀs). Thus trade policy does not aim at improving
t h et e r m so ft r a d eb ym a k i n ge x p o r tg o o d sm o r ee x p e n s i v e ,b u tr a t h e rt r i e s
to increase market shares at the expense of worsening the terms of trade.
This is the celebrated rent-shifting eﬀect.
77Conrad [1993], Barrett [1994], and Kennedy [1994] were the ﬁrst to dis-
cover that, in the presence of imperfect (Cournot) competition, emission
taxes can be used to indirectly subsidize exports by under-internalizing even
the domestic environmental damage. Whereas Conrad looks at a model
where two governments support their domestic industries to increase their
market share in a third country’s market, Kennedy [1994] studies a similar
model of a closed two-country economy. Barrett [1994], studying both quan-
tity and price competition, ﬁnds that under imperfect price competition, the
optimal unilateral policy should over-internalize marginal damage.30 31 In
a series of follow-up papers, several authors (among others Ulph [1994a],
[1994b], [1996a], [1996b], Nannerup [1998], Markusen et al. [1993, 1995],
Simpson and Bradford [1996], Hamilton and Requate [2004], and others)
extend the Conrad-Kennedy-Barrett type of model by including imperfect
information, pre-investment in cost reduction, R&D, choice of location, and
other decisions to be made before ﬁrms engage in imperfect quantity or price
competition.32 Since environmental policy in the presence of international
trade has been surveyed extensively elsewhere (see Althammer & Buchholz
[1995, 1999], Ulph [1997a, 1997b], Rauscher [1997], and Duval & Hamilton
[2002]), it is not my concern here to fully summarize the results of this lit-
erature. That literature, however, contains rival and sometimes even contra-
dictory interpretations of the decomposition of the unilaterally optimal tax
rate. Accordingly, I wish to highlight the structure of the unilateral second-
best optimal tax rate that has to target both imperfect competition at home,
which harms domestic consumers, and the market power of domestic ﬁrms on
the international market, which favors domestic welfare. For this purpose,
I shall concentrate on Cournot competition and regulation by taxes.33 It
has become fashionable to talk about ecological (or environmental) dumping
whenever a country sets its emission tax below marginal damage. Partially
following Rauscher [1994] and Duval & Hamilton [2002], I argue that this
30In contrast to Conrad and Kennedy, Barrett uses standards.
31Conrad [1996a] extends Conrad [1993] by assuming that the good supplied on the
world market by oligopolistic ﬁrms is also consumed at home. Conrad [1996b] extends
Barrett’s model by also studying taxation in a price-setting duopoly model with diﬀeren-
tiated commodities.
32Simpson and Bradford [1996] use a model of imperfect competition and R&D prior to
market competition to challenge the Porter-hypothesis proposed in Porter [1990], [1992].
33Ebert [1999] studies the strategic use of relative standards in open economies where
the regulated domestic ﬁrms exercise market power in an international market.
78view is not entirely appropriate.34
10.1 Extension of the Basic Model to International
Trade
As is usual, I assume that there are only two countries (governments), one
domestic and one foreign. Furthermore, I assume that there is a free trade
agreement such that the governments are not allowed to impose tariﬀso r
to subsidize their ﬁrms directly. I extend my basic model by denoting the
world inverse demand function by Pw(Qw),w h e r eQw is world total output.
Furthermore, I write the domestic inverse demand function as Pd(Yd), where
Yd is the domestic level of consumption. Moreover, there are nd domestic and
nf foreign ﬁrms. Ci(qi,e i) represents the cost function of a typical ﬁrm from
country i. Within one country, all ﬁr m sh a v ei d e n t i c a lt e c h n o l o g i e s( i n d u c i n g
identical cost functions). Moreover, I denote the domestic damage by Dd(Ed),
where Ed = sd
dnded + sd
fnfef is eﬀective (or ambient) pollution arriving in
the domestic country caused by emissions from both domestic and foreign
ﬁrms. Domestic emissions are multiplied by the emission coeﬃcient sd
d that
indicates how much domestic pollution aﬀects the home country, whereas
sd
f indicates how much of the foreign ﬁrms’ emissions arrive in the domestic
country. Analogously, I denote foreign damage by Df(Ef), where eﬀective





10.1.1 Cooperative Environmental Policy
In this subsection I brieﬂy study the benchmark case where governments
agree on their environmental policies in a cooperative way. In order to avoid
problems of imperfect competition in the permit market, I assume that the
governments use taxes as policy instruments. To achieve a fully cooperative
solution it is sometimes necessary for one country to compensate another
country for potential welfare losses caused by cooperative environmental pol-
icy.35 Hence I assume that transfer payments between governments are possi-
ble to achieve the cooperative outcome. This assumption allows us to ignore
34Rauscher [1994] provides a detailed discussion on the meaning of ecological dumping
in the framework of a competitive model.
35One country might be much more seriously aﬀected by pollution than an other country.
79participation constraints, thus simplifying matters considerably.36 37 In this
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f(qf,e f) − Dd(Ed) − Df(Ef).





























This implies that, when regulating its own domestic industry, each country
takes into account the marginal damage inﬂi c t e db yi t so w ni n d u s t r yo nb o t h
the domestic and the foreign country. Each country also takes into account
the oligopolistic distortion caused by its own industry on the world market.
These formulas are essentially equivalent to formula (39) in Section 4 and
can also be found in Duval and Hamilton [2002].
10.1.2 Non-Cooperative Environmental Policy
L e tu sn o wt u r nt ot h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gc a s eo fn o n - c o o p e r a t i v ep o l i c ys e t t i n g .
In this case we have to add the market value of exports and imports, to
domestic welfare. The institutional set-up in this scenario is that domestic
and foreign ﬁrms compete imperfectly à la Cournot in an international market
that may also consist of third-country markets. The governments are not
allowed to subsidize their ﬁrms directly. Hence they will conceivably attempt
to use environmental policy as trade policy. The objective function of the




Pd(Y )dY − ndC
d(qd,e d)+Pw(Qw)[ndqd − Yd] − Dd(Ed), (90)
taking into account that domestic ﬁrms compete imperfectly in the interna-
tional market. The ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions are familiar from Section 4
36This problem has often been ignored in the literature.
37In reality, direct transfer payments are not so common, but examples do exist. For
instance, Germany and the Netherlands made direct payments to France for abating eﬄu-
ents from salt mining. In other cases, indirect payments are made by negotiating multiple
issues simultaneously.
80a n dn e e dn o tb er e p e a t e dh e r e .D i ﬀerentiating (90) with respect to the tax
rate, setting the derivative equal to zero, and solving for the tax rate yields




































This decomposition, suggested by Duval and Hamilton [2002], consists of
four parts: the ﬁrst term represents the domestic marginal damage caused
by the domestic ﬁrms. The second term represents the leakage eﬀect, i.e.
the domestic marginal damage caused by the foreign ﬁrms multiplied by the
total indirect reaction of foreign ﬁrms’ emissions to a domestic tax rise and
divided by the total indirect reaction of domestic ﬁrms with respect to emis-
sions. In the normal case, i.e. if domestic and foreign ﬁrms are not too
diﬀerent, we obtain both
∂ed
∂τ < 0 and
∂qd
∂τ < 0. The latter eﬀect causes the
world market price to rise (the terms-of-trade eﬀect), and therefore induces
the foreign ﬁrms to increase output and thus also to increase emissions, i.e.
∂ef
∂τ > 0. Hence the second term of (91) is negative. Thus, even without the
strategic aspects represented by the third and the fourth term, the domestic
government should under-internalize the world’s social damage for two dif-
ferent reasons: First, it does not take into account the damage to the foreign
countries, i.e. it neglects the term D0
f(Ef)s
f
d in (88). Second, in the absence
of international coordination, the government should even under-internalize
the domestic marginal damage, since by raising the domestic emission tax
production and thus pollution shifts from home to abroad and then comes
back across the border through wind or water. Thus the second term rep-
resents protection against transboundary pollution. Note that this leakage
eﬀect is always present, even if markets are competitive. Even though, the




∂τ , depends on
the market structure. Note that taking the leakage eﬀect into account is
sometimes also called the not-in-my-backyard incentive (see Markusen et al.
[1995]).
Strategic Aspects: Taking into Account Imperfect Competition
and ”Terms of Trade versus Rent-Shifting” Let me now turn to
81the third and fourth terms. These can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways: Du-
val and Hamilton [2002] interpret the third term as the terms-of-trade-eﬀect
and the fourth term as the imperfect competition eﬀect. T h el a t t e ri sc l e a r l y
negative for the same formal reasons as in Section 4. However, the interpre-
tation is diﬀerent, as I will argue below.













∂τ is negative. The latter causes world output to fall and
thus the market price for the polluting good to rise. Although the foreign
ﬁrms react to this by increasing output38, one can show that the total eﬀect
is negative under normal conditions (i.e. if the inverse demand function is
not too convex and the ﬁrms’ cost functions are not too diﬀerent).39 The
denominator is clearly negative, as argued above. Since P0
w(Qw) < 0,t h e
whole third term is positive if and only if the domestic country is an exporter
of the polluting good.
Finally let us study the fourth term. According to Duval and Hamilton
[2002] this term corresponds to the usual imperfect competition eﬀect that
is always present, even in the absence of trade. Duval and Hamilton further
claim that the regulator has to take account of too little production and
hence this eﬀect has nothing to do with eco-dumping. The question is what
is meant by "too little production"? In a closed economy, the regulator takes
into account too little production in order to mitigate the dead weight loss
r e s u l t i n gf r o mm a r k e tp o w e r .B u te v e ni ft h et r a d e dg o o di sap u r ee x p o r t
good, i.e. if Yd =0 , as for example is the case in Conrad’s model and also
in one version of Brander and Spencer’s original model, the fourth term will
not simply vanish.
Accordingly, in my view, the interpretation of the fourth term must be
diﬀerent: the regulator wants to help the export industry to improve the
terms of trade. But due to market power, the ﬁrms can partially achieve
this on their own. This help-yourself eﬀect is represented by the fourth
term, which then has to be substracted from the terms of trade eﬀect. (By
inspection is easy to verify that the fourth term is negative.)
Let us now present an alternative decomposition of the second-best opti-
38Our assumptions guarantee downward-sloping reaction functions.
39Under perfect competition we need no further conditions to show this eﬀect. The
"normal" conditions refer to Cournot competition, where perverse eﬀects can arise under
extreme asymmetries of the ﬁrms or extreme curvatures of the inverse demand function.







































A similar decomposition has been suggested by Althammer and Buchholz
[1999]. Recall that qd denotes total domestic output, while Yd denotes do-
mestic consumption. Now we can interpret the third term as the strategic
market eﬀect, which can be positive or negative since
∂qd
∂τ is negative and
∂qf
∂τ







is less than the total change of output (which would be negative). Thus the
numerator can be positive or negative. This means that the strategic market
eﬀect can be either a terms-of-trade eﬀect or (!) a rent-shifting eﬀect.





∂τ ≈ ∂Q/∂τ < 0. If in addition qd−Yd > 0, i.e. the domestic
country is an exporter of the polluting good, the third and the fourth term
together correspond to the terms-of-trade eﬀect, and it will be optimal for the
domestic government to make the output good more expensive to improve
the terms-of-trade.
If, by contrast, the number of domestic ﬁrms nd is small, especially if






is exactly the familiar rent-shifting-eﬀect. This term is clearly negative. If
in addition, the good is a pure export good, i.e. Yd =0 ,t h e nt h et h i r da n d






∂τ ].I fa ta l l ,i ti st h i st e r mw h i c hm a yb e
interpreted as the environmental dumping eﬀect. In this case, the government
wants to make the exported good cheaper in order to gain a higher market
share in the international market and thus shifting rents from the foreign to
the domestic ﬁrms.40
40Interestingly, Duval and Hamilton [2002] do not mention the rent-shifting eﬀect, while
van Long and Soubeyran [1999] - using almost the same model and a decomposition similar
to (92) - only mention the rent-shifting eﬀect but do not refer to a terms-of-trade eﬀect.
83Let us ﬁnally interpret the fourth term in (92). This term takes into
account the welfare loss of domestic consumers due to imperfect competition.
Its sign is clearly negative, since total output decreases if the domestic tax
rate goes up. However, this eﬀect is bound to be smaller in an open economy
than in the closed economy. The reason is another leakage eﬀect: if the
domestic government lowers the emission tax to increase output for the sake
of increasing the domestic consumer surplus, the foreign ﬁrms will react by
reducing their output, which harms the domestic consumers. Therefore, the
regulator makes less of an eﬀort to increase domestic consumption in an open
economy than in a closed economy.
The bottom line from this analysis is that it depends crucially on the
number of domestic ﬁrms whether the (domestic) government sets out to
use the emission tax to improve the terms-of-trade or elects the opposite by
increasing international market shares in order to shift rents from the foreign
to the domestic ﬁrms. So allowing for more than just one ﬁrm in each country,
as done by both Althammer & Buchholz [1995,1999] and Duval & Hamilton
[2002], gives useful insights which are not possible in the one-ﬁrm-per-country
models proposed by Conrad [1993], Barrett [1994], and follow-up papers such
as Ulph [1994, 1996a, 1996b].
Note ﬁnally that, in this section, we have been investigating only quantity
competition. It not possible to extend this analysis in a simple way to the
model of price competition à la Barrett to the case of more than one ﬁrm
in each country. The reason is that imperfect price competition requires
diﬀerentiated products. However, apart from the Dixit-Stiglitz model, which
does not really model the strategic interaction between ﬁrms, and Salop’s
model of the circular city, there exist no symmetric models of imperfect price
competition with more than two competing ﬁrms.
10.1.3 Extensions to Models with Endogenous Numbers of Firms
There are a small number of recent papers that endogenize the number of
ﬁrms in each country. Gürtzgen and Rauscher [2000] consider a model with
the Dixit-Stiglitz type of monopolistic competition. They ﬁnd that a stricter
environmental domestic standard need not lead to an increase in domestic
pollution. In our parlance, this means that the second term in (91) or in (92)
need not necessarily be negative. Moreover, the standard improves the terms
of trade in the domestic country. Finally, there is a negative term accounting
for imperfect competition (similar to the closed economy model suggested
84by Lange and Requate [1999]). Thus in total, the marginal abatement costs
may exceed or fall short of marginal damage.
Bayindir-Upmann [2004] studies a Cournot model where the domestic
number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed while the foreign number of ﬁrms is determined
endogenously by a zero-proﬁt condition. He shows that an increase in the
domestic emission tax leads to an increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms but
leaves total output and total pollution unaﬀected (domestic pollution goes
down if the pollutant is not fully transboundary). Thus by raising the do-
mestic tax rate, domestic production is crowded out at a one-to-one rate by
foreign producers. An increase of the foreign emission tax, by contrast, leads
to a decrease in the number of foreign ﬁrms and a reduction in total pollu-
tion. Hence the second-best optimal tax structure for the foreign government
corresponds to (91) whereas for the domestic government the terms-of-trade
eﬀect vanishes. This is the case because the domestic government is not able
to inﬂuence the foreign ﬁrms’ costs. Consequently, the domestic government
i sn o ta b l et oi n ﬂuence the terms of trade. Raising the tax rate would only
result in losing market shares to the foreign country.
11 Conclusions and Proposals for Further Re-
search
In this chapter I have summarized the main issues and results relating to
environmental policy when ﬁrms subject to environmental regulation exercise
market power on at least one market. The bulk of the literature refers to
situations where the ﬁrms have market power on the output market, the most
prominent of these models being monopoly, diﬀerent kinds of oligopoly, and
monopolistic competition.
The majority of models summarized in this chapter work on the assump-
tion that a regulator has only one instrument for the regulation of various
market imperfections, excessive pollution, insuﬃcient output, and - some-
times - excessive market entry. One typical result is that the second-best
optimal price for pollution is below the marginal social damage caused by
the pollution. Roughly speaking, the reason is that, in comparison to a mar-
ket structure with perfect competition, ﬁrms exercising market power hold
down output and thus pollute less. How relevant is this insight? We have
seen that the second-best optimal tax rate depends crucially on the size of the
85demand elasticity of the relevant market in which market power is exercised.
Is it feasible to set particular tax rates for each market in which polluting
ﬁrms exercise market power? In many cases, ﬁrms with market power in a
particular market emit the same pollutant as other ﬁrms engaging in perfect
competition in some other market. Is it feasible to set discriminatory taxes
in this case? If it is, a whole array of diﬀerent tax rates may be subject to
lobbying eﬀort by the industry thus regulated. Note that Innes et al. [1991]
is one of the few papers that studies simultaneous regulation of both a large
monopolistic ﬁrm and many competitive small polluting ﬁrms.
Moreover, we have seen two interesting theoretical ﬁndings. First, in
Cournot models with free entry, the Pigouvian tax equal to marginal damage
seems to be a good rule of thumb. Second, as Misiolek [1988] has pointed out,
even in the monopoly case, rent-seeking eﬀorts lead to (second-best optimal)
tax rates higher than the monopoly tax rule, as was originally suggested by
Barnett [1980]. So even under imperfect competition, the Pigouvian rule is
not such a bad option. Accordingly, from a normative point of view, it seems
to be a good strategy to stick to the Pigouvian rule and to encourage more
competition through tough anti-trust laws or - if monopoly power cannot be
excluded - by direct control of market power.
From my survey it has become evident that not every pollution-control
instrument has been investigated for each kind of market structure. For
example, in models of monopolistic competition it is largely the impact of
taxes and second-best tax rules that has been investigated. It is certainly
not necessary to ﬁll up all the gaps by investigating each instrument for each
kind of market structure. However, the observations I have outlined above
indicate several directions for further research: The ﬁrst one is empirical. It
would be important to measure the market power (performance) of polluting
ﬁrms in the output market in order to assess how serious the distortion from
applying the Pigouvian rule to imperfectly competitive markets will be, and
also for determining the second-best optimal tax levels in practice, if this is
necessary. Determining the size of the second-best optimal tax rates would
also require to the empirical estimation of demand elasticities for the output
commodities.
A second avenue of research would be to investigate the relationship be-
tween anti-trust and environmental policy. As a matter of fact, in most
countries competition law prevents a monopolist from simply charging the
monopoly price (e.g. according to Art. 82 of the European Treatise abuse
of market power is not allowed). Some industries with potential monopoly
86power, notably utilities, are subject to even stricter regulations. Given these
institutional settings, the simple second-best optimal tax formulas, as devel-
oped by Barnett [1980] and many others including myself, do not apply.
Third, it would be interesting to investigate whether there are incentives
for ﬁrms to (ab)use voluntary environmental agreements and commitments in
o r d e rt ob y p a s sa n t i - t r u s tl a w s .( N o t et h a tc a p so ne m i s s i o n si m p l yc a p so n
output and thus raise prices). One paper aiming in this direction is Conrad
[2001], who addresses a similar questions in a strategic international trade
framework.
Moreover, there are very few papers studying the simultaneous regulation
o fb o t hm a r k e tp o w e ra n dp o l l u t i o n .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h em o s ts i m p l er u l ei st o
tax emissions and subsidize output. Subsidies, however, are prohibited by
several international agreements (EU Treatise, WTO rules etc.). Therefore
more sophisticated mechanisms have to be developed for regulating a number
of market imperfections. Besides Laﬀont (1994), Kim and Chang (1993)
present one of the few papers proposing mechanisms for regulating both
imperfections on the output market and externalities caused by pollution.
Certainly more needs to be done on this issue.
B e s i d e sm a r k e tp o w e ro nt h eo u t p u tm a r k e tw eh a v ea l s os u m m a r i z e d
models with market power on factor markets. One important factor market
is the market for emission-permits, which has attracted much attention from
researchers since Hahn’s inﬂuential paper [1984]. One unsatisfactory feature
in this and several follow-up models is the exogenous and rather arbitrary
division of ﬁrms into powerful and competitive ﬁrms. Here an issue for further
research would be the question of how to endogenize the degree of market
power depending on ﬁrm size. This question is certainly not speciﬁct o
permit markets, though it is of special interest there since big and small
ﬁrms interact in the same market. Possible tools for solving this problem
could include techniques from the theory of multi-unit auctions.
Moreover, it has become clear from the analysis of factor markets that
knowledge about market power in a particular market to be regulated is
not enough. Strictly speaking, the regulator has to know the whole vertical
structure, including the degree of market power at each step of the production
chain, in order to determine the optimal tax rate, or the level of some other
policy instrument. On this point, too, we still know relatively little about the
relationship between optimal tax rules and market power at diﬀerent stages
of the production process.
A further point which has only been treated in the literature with reference
87to tradable permits is compliance. As summarized above, several authors,
such as van Egteren and Weber [1996], Malik [2002], and Chavez and Stran-
lund [2003], have investigated the consequences of optimal permit policies
when some ﬁr m se x e r c i s em a r k e tp o w e ri nt h em a r k e tf o rt r a d a b l ep e r m i t s
and some ﬁrms do not fully comply to the regulations (i.e. if they emit in
excess of the number of allowances they hold). This problem, however, is
not speciﬁc to the permit instrument. Thus there is need for more general
consideration of the relationship between the optimal level of pricing instru-
ments and the optimal level of monitoring. There is also need to investigate
the relationship between the pricing instrument and penalty fees in case of
non-compliance.
In all the models studied here, pollution and the damage resulting from
it is assumed to be deterministic. However, in many cases random elements
may determine either emissions or damage. For example, accidental haz-
ardous emissions may result from insuﬃcient care on the ﬁrms’ part. For
those cases we have a diﬀerent tool-box of environmental policy rules, i.e.
liability rules such as strict liability or negligence. To my knowledge, the
market structure of output markets has never been an issue in the literature
discussing these rules. But even if emissions are determined completely by
both output and the ﬁrms’ abatement eﬀort, the resulting damage may be
inﬂuenced by natural shocks to resilience and nature’s capacity for reducing
pollution. Sometimes even the weather conditions are crucial in determining
the size of the damage. In connection with stochastic damages, too, diﬀerent
forms of market structures have yet to be taken into account. In particular,
we do not know how optimal emission taxes look like if ﬁr m sh a v em a r k e t
power and damages are stochastic.
Besides the need for further theoretical and much more empirical work,
experimental work may be useful to pre-test diﬀerent forms of regulation
in the laboratory. Surprisingly, there is a considerable amount of experi-
mental research on the Hahn model, i.e. a permit market with one big and
many small ﬁrms. There are, however, almost no experimental contributions
on alternative forms of regulation. In particular it might be interesting to
test mechanisms designed to regulate several distortions, such as the elegant
mechanism suggested by Kim and Chang [1993]. The interesting issue here is
that the price of pollution and the implicit subsidy on output does not only
depend on the setting of the regulator, but also on the (strategic) behavior
of the other ﬁrms. Since those mechanisms are relatively complex, it is far
from clear whether the ﬁrms will fully understand the regulation scheme and
88whether they will act in a way that accords with what the theory predicts. If
it turns out that ﬁrms behave diﬀerently from theoretical predictions, this has
further consequences for the proper design of regulatory multi-issue schemes.
Although this chapter has become rather long and I have tried to cover
the static models of complete information as fully as possible, I have only
been able to touch on the literature on environmental policy under imper-
fect competition including (a) asymmetric information (see e.g. Kim and
Chang [1993], Laﬀont [1994]), (b) dynamic modelling of accumulating pol-
lutants (e.g. Benchekroun and Van Long [1997]), (c) R&D decisions prior
to production (see e.g. Montero [2002a, 2002b], Fisher et al. [2003], and
Requate [2005]), and several other issues. In particular the last-named issue
is a promising ﬁeld of research, since environmental regulation has a crucial
impact on the direction taken by technological progress, and R&D typically
creates market structures where only a small number of ﬁrms conduct R&D
projects and thus engage in imperfect competition.
Finally, maybe a caveat is in place. Despite the need for further research
in the various directions outlined above, distinguishing too many structural
forms of competition and oﬀering too many second-best rules for diﬀerent
instruments could do more harm than good to the authority of economics
as a discipline. Politicians need simple and clear-cut rules. Complicated
rules depending on too many parameters, such as marginal damage, demand
elasticities in the output market, market conduct, and many more, may be
either not be applied at all, or they run the risk of being manipulated by
lobbyists. This gives rise to a ﬁnal avenue of research, i.e. the dimension
of political economy, and the question of which instruments and which in-
stitutional frameworks deciding on the level of those instruments are most
eﬀective in resisting the inﬂuence of political interest groups.
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